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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the U.S.-India relationship in the
context of a world power interacting with the predominant
regional power. The growing Indian military's power projection
and nuclear weapons capability make the Indian Ocean region a
critical area for American foreign policy during the next
decade. New Delhi's desire to be a hegemonic power in the
region combined with the U.S. military drawdown in reaction to
the changing strategic environment could threaten long-term
U.S. interests. The United States can no long afford to remain
relatively disinterested in the region and must develop a
comprehensive policy to promote regional security and
stability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet
Union has embarked on a new approach to foreign policy, the
results of which were exemplified by the image shattering
events of 1989 and the recent reunification of Germany. As a
result of the new emerging world order, the United States must
reevaluate its global relations and commitments. The United
States will probably allocate fewer resources to Europe as the
threat of war in the European theater decreases. Indeed, U.S.
interests in Europe are changing, perhaps relatively declining
as other regions gain in importance. As part of the
reevaluation of American relations and commitments, it is
critical for Washington to examine U.S. policies toward India
and the Indian Ocean region. The United States may well have
underestimated India in the past. Recent events in the Indian
Ocean region indicate the United States should not ignore this
emerging regional power.
Taking into account the implications of the shifting
global strategic environment, the primary objective of this
thesis is to assess Indian security interests, military
capabilities, the regional threat environment and India's
changing power projection ability. This analysis will provide
the basis for briefly indicating and assessing potential U.S.
security and strategic policy options for the region.
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Throughout the thesis, two tracks will be considered: India's
apparent intention and growing capability to be the hegemonic
power in South Asia; and regional reaction to that intention
and capability, especially regional concern with India as a
perceived threat.
The second chapter will provide a concise assessment of
the U.S.-India relationship, a relationship evolving largely
as a result of changing U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean
region. This chapter will provide the framework for
determining the significance of India as a major U.S.
interest. Chapter II will also assess India's security
dilemmas and concerns, to ascertain whether India represents
a threat to the region's stability, as well as to iindicate
India's perceived threats. The chapter will look at New
Delhi's domestic and regional rationale for expanding the
Indian military and the impact the Indian military buildup has
on Indian power projection capability. The assessment in this
chapter is critical to understanding India's perceptions of
its military requirements, Indian policy initiatives in the
region, and the potential for continuing and heightened
regional instability.
Since 1971, the Indian government has enjoyed a "special
relationship" with the Soviet government. Among other things,
the Soviet Union provides military equipment in exchange for
Indian consumer goods. India's relationship with the Soviet
Union currently constitutes New Delhi's most critical
2
bilateral relationship. Chapter III will thus examine India's
"alliance" with the Soviets. One of the vital issues analyzed
in this chapter is India's assessment of Mikhail Gorbachev and
New Delhi's evaluation of anticipated Soviet support to India
during the 1990s. Changing Soviet relations with Pakistan and
China may well alter Soviet-Indian relations. Of equal
importance is a recalculation by New Delhi and Moscow of the
merits of their "special relationship" in light of dynamic
internal economic and international military shifts.
One major foreign policy tool for India is its military
capability. Chapter IV will assess India's growing defense
establishment, examining the changing roles of the military,
India's nuclear capability, and the economy's capacity to
support the continuing defense buildup. Defense planning and
subsequent spending must be evaluated to determine the
circumstances under which India could deploy its military and
further develop its nuclear weapons capability.
The final chapter will briefly examine the implications of
Indian military development and power projection in the region
for U.S. regional interests. This chapter will also attempt
to indicate if India's role as the emerging regional hegemonic
power of South Asia is in the American interest. Finally,
this chapter will indicate options and propose recommendations
for U.S. policy toward India.
3
II. INDIA-UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP:
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?
Disharmony has dominated relations between the United
States and India since World War II. Areas of mutual
interest, such as a shared belief in the principles of
democracy and the desirability of economic development, have
been unable to provide the foundation for a sustained,
cooperative relationship between the two nations.
Since the end of World War II, U.S. policy in South Asia
has been characterized by varying degrees of interest and
involvement. Critical events in the region, usually centered
on the use of, or threat to use, military force have been
instrumental in shifting the focus of U.S. interests.
However, the emerging new world order includes not only
warming relations between adversaries and renewed competition
between friends, but possibly, and more importantly, a more
fundamental shift in U.S. global interests and priorities.
Today, the ice of the Cold War has been chipped away by
glasnost and perestroika, casting a new light, not only on
U.S.-Soviet relations, but also on bilateral relations between
the United States and other national actors, such as India.
At the same time, the dynamic international situation has
forced India to reevaluate its relationships with the world's
4
major powers. India is attempting to maintain its present
security, political, and economic relationship with the USSR,
while simultaneously seeking to improve relations with the
United States.
This chapter will provide a concise overview of the
friction-filled U.S.-India relationship since India's
independence in 1947. Long term objectives and interests in
the region are critical in determining possible U.S. policy
options regarding India during the next decade.
A. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA
American interests on the subcontinent have varied since
India's independence, but U.S. policy towards India has not
significantly changed. In general, U.S. policymakers have
viewed South Asia in the context of the Cold War and the
containment of communism. American foreign policy interests
in the region are most clearly evident in five areas: the
People's Republic of China (PRC); Pakistan; Soviet-Indian
relations; neutralization of the Indian Ocean; and Indian
nuclear capability.
I. People's Republic of China in U.S.-India Relations
During the 1950s, Sino-Indian relations were troubled,
but not in serious disharmony. Although Tibet was an issue
between Beijing and New Delhi, India's elites saw no threat
from the North/Northeast. In any event, for Nehru,
establishing rapport with Beijing was not a top priority. For
5
the Indian government, the cnly perceived threat to India wa
Pakistan, and consequently, New Delhi positioned the majority
of its army to combat Pakistani, not Chinese troops. Prime
Minister Nehru was less concerned with regional power
politics.1
With relatively few military assets available, Indian
officials concentrated the majority of available forces to the
west, against Pakistan, leaving relatively few troops to
defend the North/Northeast frontier from the People's Republic
of China (PRC). To general surprise, on 20 October 1962,
Chinese military forces invaded India, sweeping through the
Himalayan passes and crushing a totally unprepared Indian
Army. Four days later, the PRC issued a statement on the
border question and proposed a ceasefire and withdrawal of the
forces of both sides a distance of twelve miles. India
rejected China's interpretation of the boundary between India
and China. Beijing's position was clear:
There is a traditional customary boundary between the two
countries, but the boundary between the two countries has
never been formally delimited. The so-called McMahon Line
in the eastern sector is a line which the British
imperialists attempted to force upon China by taking
" Ashok Kapur, "The Indian Subcontinent: The
Contemporary Structure of Power and the Development of Power
Relations," Asian Survey, July 1988, pp. 694-695, 703-704. In
his "globalism" foreign policy, Nehru felt that the best way
to stay out of a war was to have noo military other than one
for limited defense.
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advantage of t~e powerlessness of the Chinese and the
Indian peoples.
In response to China's invasion, on 26 October, Prime
Minister Nehru requested unspecified military aid from the
U.S., Britain, France and Canada. The war had "swept away
Nehru's resistance" to accept military assistance.3 Three
days later, Nehru asked Washington for arms. U.S. Ambassador
to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, notified Nehru that the
United States "would airlift infantry weapons to India ...
heavier weapons would follow if needed.'4 Small arms began
arriving on 3 November, continuing until 10 November.
On 31 October, Nehru dismissed the defence minister,
V.K. Krishna Menon, and assumed the role as Minister of
Defence, again requesting U.S. military assistance in the face
of Chinese advances.5  Nehru requested the transfer of 15
fighter squadrons. On 21 November, te United States
2 "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic
of China," 24 October 1962, The Sino-Indian Boundary Question,
2nd ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962), p. 1.
3 Neville Maxwell, India's China War (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1970), p. 378.
4 Congressional Quarterly, Inc., China: US Policy Since1945 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p.
132.
5 Maxwell, India's China War, pp. 361-363. See also C.
Sadasivan, "The Nehru-Menon Partnership," The Round Table,
January 1987. The Indian public's perception was that Menon,
a personally close associate of Nehru was pro-Chinese. Nehru
was not blamed for being unprepared for war. Rather, Menon
was dismissed, a "sacrifice necessary for Nehru's survival."
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responded by moving one U.S. aircraft carrier toward India,
but rejected the remainder of the request. 6 On the same day,
the Chinese government issued a statement, calling for a
ceasefire along the Indian border.
Beginning from the day following that of the issuance of
the present statement, i.e., from 00:00 hours on November
22, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire
along the entire Sino-Indian border.. .The Sino-Indian
boundary question is an issue between two Asian countries.
China and India should settle this issue peacefully; they
should not cross swords on account of this issue and even
less allow U.S. imperialism to poke in its hand and
develop the present unfortunate border conflict into a war
in which Asians are made to fight Asians.
With PRC troops unilaterally withdrawing, fighting ended the
next day, although Nehru rejected the Chinese offer for
negotiations, and no official border was established. The
impact of the defeat was such a blow to the Indians that they
revised the priority of defense in their national objectives.
But, even though China humiliated India, Pakistan remained
India's primary adversary.
During the Sino-Indian Border Dispute, India surprised
the United States at the United Nations. Although India was
attempting to ward off the Chinese in northeastern India, New
Delhi was pitted against the United States, arguing that China
should be admitted to the UN, "where it would be open to the
6 Congressional Quarterly, China: U.S. Policy Since
1945, p. 133.
7 The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, pp. 43, 46.
8
'views and discipline' of the organization." 8 U.S. policy at
the time was, of course, against admitting China to the U.N.
By the mid-1960s the Sino-Soviet rift was apparent to
the world, drastically changing India's strategic environment.
In the context of U.S. containment policy, the 1962 Chinese
attack on India raised U.S. concern in checking the PRC. As
Washington provided military assistance to New Delhi, Pakistan
turned to China, gaining support from Beijing in a 26 December
1962 agreement which recognized Pakistan's control over
Kashmir.9  Although Washington supported arms sales to New
Delhi following the 1962 border conflict with China, the
military assistance programs in India and Pakistan ended in
1965 in light of renewed fighting.
India continues to have border disputes with China
today, although they are not a priority for either country.
Another Chinese attack, as in 1962, is not probable, although
rivalry persists.
The border conflict does not seem to be the primary
cause of continued Sino-Indian tension, however. The threat
which China presents appears to be a symptom of larger Indian
fears of threats to its national security. For New Delhi, the
8 Congressional Quarterly, China: U.S. Policy Since
1945, p. 132. On 30 October, the UN voted 56 to 42 (12
abstentions) to reject a Soviet resolution for the PRC's
admission to the UN.
9 The Kashmir was still being disputed between Pakistan
and India. See below, pp. 11-17.
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Chinese "threat" is not so much as an invader, but rather as
first, an instigator of anti-India alliance with others, and
second, a rival for regional dominance.
Although Washington and New Delhi disagreed over
American policy in Vietnam, U.S. withdrawal from Indochina in
the mid-1970s, coincided with increasing Sino-Indian
rivalry.10 Mrs. Gandhi saw an opportunity to advance India's
power in Southeast Asia by preventing Chinese expansion into
that region. The Indian concern that Vietnam might become
part of the Chinese sphere of influence provided New Delhi
with another bond to the Soviet Union. India's continuing
suspicions of the United States were mirrored in renewed
American suspicions of India.11
Today, New Delhi is very concerned that Indian
interests could be disregarded with Sino-Soviet rapprochement
and growing accommodation between the United States and USSR.
Nevertheless, in this era of promising relationships, Soviet-
Chinese amity also means that the USSR is less likely to
10 John W. Garver, "Chinese-Indian Rivalry in Indochina,"
Asian Survey, November 1987, p. 1206.
11 Garver, "Chinese-Indian Rivalry in Indochina," p.
1217.
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thwart attempts by the Indians and Chinese to improve
relations. 12
At the moment China is not competing with India for
regional leadership of South Asia, but this could be a
potential problem for the Indians as the Chinese attempt to
increase their influence throughout South and Southeast Asia.
The Chinese still view themselves as the center of the world,
and Asia's natural leader. As China attempts to influence
other Southeast and South Asian nations, India may perceive it
as an encroachment on its territory. As the power projection
capability of both nations grows, especially in their naval
forces, the two states could clash in the South China Seas or
the Straits of Malacca, effectively turning the flank of the
traditional continental defense position.13
It is critical to acknowledge that the Chinese
invasion of India in 1962 was the deciding factor for Nehru to
bolster Indian defense capability. An important lesson was
12 See Sumit Ganguly, "The Sino-Indian Border Talks,
1981-1989: A View from New Delhi," Asian Survey, December
1989, pp. 1123-1135, for a summary of the progress made during
the first eight rounds of discussion. Since 1980, eight
border discussion groups have convened in an attempt to
resolve the border issue between the PRC and India. A ninth
conference has been scheduled to continue the dialogue in
hopes of an acceptable resolution, yet no agenda has ever been
set.
13 This concern over a potential Sino-Indian rivalry in
S.E. Asia may partly explain the current mini-arms buildup
with ASEAN.
ii
learned by Nehru that non-alignment alone was not enough to
deter aggression.
2. Pakistan in U.S.-India Relations
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League,
declared in March 1940 that two separate nations, India and
Pakistan, should be formed. The Muslim League, determined to
have two nations, continued to strive for the creation of an
independent Islamic state.
14
Attempts to resolve the issue of a united India were
spurned, as the Congress Party rejected an interim government.
Congress was "unwilling to accord the Muslim league its claim
to represent all Muslims and therefore have the right to fill
all seats reserved for Muslims in the Cabinet." 15 In turn,
Jinnah wanted to show that Hindus and Muslims could not
cooperate and to prove that the only solution was the
formation of a separate state.16  Suspicion and fear
enveloped the two new countries from the onset of
independence: the beginning was stormy.
Migration, financial and boundary disputes were only
the beginning of unresolved issues. The problem of the
14 Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India: Government and
Politics in a Developing Nation, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1980), p. 37.
15 Hardgrave, India: Government and Politics, p. 40.
16 The British decided that predominantly Muslim
provinces would form a separate state; territories with equal
numbers of Hindus and Muslims would be divided.
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princely states arose. The British informed the princes that
they could either join one of the new nations or attempt to
maintain their independence. Kashmir remained unresolved and
indirectly contributed to a significant portion of defense
spending over the past forty years. It is strategically
important to both India and Pakistan, positioned between
India, Pakistan, the Chinese provinces of Tibet and Sinkiang,
and the Soviet Union. More importantly, it was a symbol that
Muslims could be content in a secular state (India) or that
they could not (Pakistan).
The long-term problem between the United States and
India lies in American foreign policy towards Pakistan.
Following the Korean War, U.S. policymakers felt that military
considerations were more important than economic development.
During a visit to the Middle East and South Asia in May 1953,
Secretary of State Dulles determined that "bilateral
arrangements with individual states could lead to a more
formal regional security system."17  Dulles found Pakistan
receptive but not India.
Pakistan was anxious to acquire U.S. military
assistance. Its economy was in trouble and it needed arms.
Nehru was concerned over Pakistan's acceptance of U.S.
military assistance, stating that a American-Paki~tani
17 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great
Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 92.
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alliance "would bring the cold war to India's borders."
8
However, Washington initially saw India as .at least neutral"
if not on the side of the communists in the Cold War.
Nevertheless, in a letter to Nehru, President Eisenhower
stressed that American military assistance to Pakistan was not
directed against India. Nehru reportedly considered
Eisenhower's comments to be hollow.
19
When Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) in 1954, the United States, in effect,
provided a military assistance program to India's primary
adversary. Pakistan's decision to join SEATO was primarily
based on its perception that refraining from membership would
possibly reduce American economic and military assistance. In
signing the treaty, Pakistan referred to aggression, but not
only Communist aggression - clearly Pakistan was concerned
over Indian bellicosity.
The U.S. position raised problems. By working to
obtain allies in Asia, the United States had been pulled into
regional quarrels which were of limited concern to the United
States. Additionally, Washington has been generally connected
to the "weaker country." Although the United States based its
is Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 96.
19 Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 97.
20 Pakistan was the link to Southeast Asian defense as
well as the Middle East security system through CENTO, a link
in the containment of Soviet expansion.
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commitment to Pakistan on containing communism, Pakistani
officials expected the United States to follow an anti-Indian
stance, since the United States was not "pro-India.'"21 For
India's part, it had already hinted that it would pursue ties
with the Soviet Union if the United States provided military
assistance to Pakistan. Nevertheless, as one of the results of
the 1962 Chinese invasion, a joint U.S.-UK-Indian air defense
exercise was conducted in 1963 and a long term agreement for
U.S. arms transfer to India was agreed to in April 1964.22
In turn, Pakistan now feared a U.S. policy shift toward India,
and attempted to cultivate ties with the PRC.
23
Meanwhile, tension was building between India and
Pakistan with the United States caught in the middle. Indian
officials claimed that Pakistan used American arms in border
fighting, although India also used American weapons against
Pakistan. The United States had naively assured India that
Pakistan would not use American weapons against India, yet
Washington was unwilling to pressure Islamabad to restrain its
actions.
In 1965, the United States reduced its interest in the
subcontinent: indeed the 1965 India-Pakistan War, which proved
21 Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 106.
22 As indicated earlier, India requested US military
assistance during the 1962 border conflict with China. U.S.
..ilitary aid continued following the ceasefire.
Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 187.
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to be a political disaster for Washington. The United States
had provided arms to both countries with the naive stipulation
that they would not be used against each other.
In an attempt to develop a coherent foreign policy
with its new role as a superpower, the United States
befriended Pakistan. In the context of the Cold War, the
decision was appropriate, but insensitive to Indian attitudes.
The United States lacked an appreciation for the animosity
which India felt towards Pakistan.
The United States did not reassert itself into the
region until the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis. This conflict was a
major obstacle to improving U.S.-India ties in the early
1970s. Indian troops moved into East Pakistan because New
Delhi saw military action as "the most appropriate" option to
resolve the refugee crisis on its borders. Indian troops
moved into East Pakistan in December 1971 to "liberate"
Bangladesh. Quickly overrunning the country, India declared
the new state of Bangladesh. Washington responded by sending
the Enterprise carrier group into the Bay of Bengal, which
India considered to be outside interference in a regional
dispute.
ThL United States supported Pakistan in this crisis.
Secretary of State Kissinger told Indian officials that if
they attacked Pakistan, China would attack India, and the
16
United States would not assist in India's defense.24  This
policy was presumably prompted by the United States desire to
normalize relations with the PRC. Ironically, New Delhi
initially was receptive to U.S.-PRC rapprochement which India
felt might assist China into being admitted into the United
Nations and would work toward peace in Vietnam.
26
On the other hand, New Delhi was concerned that its
interests could be adversely affected by the improved
relations. In particular, Indian officials viewed with alarm
any potential military alliance among the PRC, Pakistan, and
the United States. During the 1971 Bangladesh War, neither
the Chinese nor the American military actively joined Pakistan
in its struggle against India. Intent on improving U.S.-PRC
relations, U.S. support for India was hindered by the possibly
negative impact it would have on reestablishing America's
relations with China. In effect, the United States chose
Beijing over New Delhi.
Although United States officials recognized that due
to India's resources, markets, strategic position and sheer
size, it deserved greater U.S. interest, relations did not
improve. Furthermore, Washington lacked credibility with the
2' James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States
Foreign Policy and World Order, 4th ed. (Glenview, Illinois:
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), p. 325.
25 Hardgrave, India: Government and Politics, p. 251.
26 Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 246.
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Indian government.27  Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
returned from Washington in 1971 with a U.S. imposed "hold" on
military shipments to Pakistan. However, a bureaucratic
problem resulted in an estimated $3.8 million worth of small
arms being sent to Pakistan between March 25 and September 30,
1971. 28 It appeared to the Indian government that the United
States broke its embargo agreement not to ship arms to
Pakistan, as arms and parts were delivered during that time
period. However, this appears to be an unfair criticism of
the United States since the arms shipped were ordered prior to
March 25. New licenses for American exports were not issued
nor were they renewed, but previously issued licenses were not
revoked. 29
Other U.S. decisions during the 1970s adversely
impacted U.S.-India relations. The Symington Amendment of
1979 does not allow the U.S. Congress to approve military aid
for states which appear to be developing nuclear weapons.
As a result, in 1979, the United States cut off military aid
to Pakistan as it made its nuclear aspirations clear.
27 Christopher Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited:
Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia," Asian Survey,
April 1980, p. 344.
28 Van Hollen, "The Tilt Policy Revisited," Asian Survey,
April 1980, p. 344.
9 Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers, p. 245.
The Symington Amendment was an amendment to the 1961
Foreign Assistance Act.
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However, the decision to suspend arms transfers to Pakistan
was overturned as a result of the December 1979 Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. In May 1981 the United States
approved a $3.2 billion aid deal; half of the package was
military aid which included the sale of 40 F-16s and which
waived the Symington Amendment. New Delhi rejected
Washington's justification for countering Soviet expansion by
using U.S. military assistance to Islamabad. As Islamabad
aided the Afghans, New Delhi feared that Pakistan might turn
the U.S. arms toward Islamabad's traditional adversary, India.
The U.S. decision on military sales to Pakistan was
prompted by the Soviet invasion and fears of continued Soviet
expansion. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
1989 and in the context of the new world order, the United
States is now reassessing its arms transfers to Pakistan. Due
to "new evidence" of Pakistan's joining the "nuclear club,"
Washington suspended military aid to Pakistan on October
1990. 31
3. Soviet Union in U.S.-India Relations
Although one American policy objective in South Asia
concerned itself with reducing Soviet influence in the region,
paradoxically Soviet interaction, militarily and politically,
has been far greater than American influence in India. Waning
31 Sheila Tefft, "Stung by Aid Suspension, Pakistan
Reviews Uneasy Dependence on U.S.," Christian Science Monitor,
30 October 1990.
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U.S. interest after 1965 created an opportunity for the Soviet
Union, an opportunity eagerly grasped by Moscow.
After the sudden death of India's Prime Minister
Shastri in 1966 the Congress Party selected Indira Gandhi as
Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi continued her nation's policy of
nonalignment. However, apparent Soviet evenhandedness toward
Pakistan irritated Mrs. Gandhi. Indira's foreign policy
perspective was somewhat less globally and more regionally
focused than Nehru. Both agreed, however, that the
intervention of external powers in regional affairs was
unacceptable.
With Soviet encouragement, ir -'-ly 1966, Mrs. Gandhi
called for a cessation of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam.
However, India did not go as far in its statement as the
Soviets wanted--a condemnation of U.S. activities in
Indochina. Nevertheless, during Premier Kosygin's visit to
New Delhi in January 1968, the two leaders issued a joint
communique, calling for the unconditional cessation of U.S.
bombing in North Vietnam.
As the previous section indicated, China became
involved on the subcontinent in the 1960s. The PRC began
providing Pakistan with military equipment, causing concern in
New Delhi. The Pakistani action could have provided India
with the motivation to open discussions with Moscow in 1969.
The impact of the U.S. decision to use Pakistan to open
relations with Beijing certainly forced New Delhi officials to
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consider the potential encirclement by hostile neighbors and
to search for a superpower which could be brought into the
region on India's side. Consequently, by signing a treaty
with Moscow in the summer of 1971, Indira considered the U.S.
neutralized in the region by the Soviet Unini. New Delhi thus
considered India now to be the emergin hegemonic power in the
regi(.
Through the early 1970s the United States was
distracted by its withdrawal from Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli
War and the resulting oil embargo, and Watergate. All of
these issues effectively prevented any new U.S. initiatives
toward New Delhi.
The election of President Carter in 1976 ushered in a
new era in U.S. foreign policy. The Carter Administration
undertook major initiatives to try to improve U.S.-India
relations. In July 1977 Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher stated in New Delhi that the United States looked
to India to provide the leadership in South Asia.32 This new
approach coincided with the election of the Janata Coalition
Government following national elections in India. Morarji
Desai, India's new Prime Minister, tried to return to a
traditional non-aligned foreign policy. The Carter
Administration's pursuit of conventional arms control was well
32 Zalmay Khalilzad, Timothy George, Robert Litwak, and
Shahram Chubin, Security in Southern Asia (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1984), p. 161.
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received in India.33 However, the Administration's interest
in curtailing the spread nuclear weapons through the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was not well received.3
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 not only
increased Washington's concern about the region, but severely
degraded U.S.-India relations. As the United States began a
rapid modernization of the Pakistani military, to meet the
Soviet threat, it not only drove a wedge into U.S.-India
relations, but pushed India closer to its source of arms, the
Soviet Union. Additionally, Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in
January 1980. As Soviet-Indian relations became closer and
more cordial as India reacted to Pakistan's increased military
threat, Washington in turn became increasingly antagonized by
New Delhi. Indeed, with respect to U.S.-India relations, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and India's refusal to condemn
the action, adversely affected any continuation in improving
bilateral relations between the two countries.
Overall, throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s, the
Soviets successfully seized opportunities to strengthen ties
with the Indians and to spread Soviet influence in the region.
In turn, New Delhi saw an opportunity to manipulate the Indo-
33 See the following section on "Neutralization of the
Indian Ocean," pp. 22-26.
New Delhi saw and continues to see the NPT as a means
of denying to those outside "the Club," the power and prestige
associated with nuclear weapons. For Indian officials, this
suggests that Third World countries would act more
irresponsible than those with such weapons.
22
Soviet relationship to its benefit. On balance, as Chapter
III indicates, India's power projection capability has been
enhanced through its bilateral relationship with Moscow.
Currently, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and
warming U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1990s, have reduced the
salience of "containing" the USSR in the region. Indeed,
Soviet influence in the region seems to be receding.
4. Neutralization of the Indian Ocean
Although supported by New Delhi, the 1971 Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace initiative was not presented to the United
Nations by India, nor did the Indians co-sponsor the
resolution.35 When introduced to the General Assembly, India
had "serious reservations" concerning the interpretation of
and changes to the proposal.36 The proposal pressed:
all states to consider and respect the India Ocean as a
zone of peace from which Great Power rivalries and
competition, as well as bases conceived in the context of
such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air
35 S. Bilveer, "India and the Indian Ocean as a Zone of
Peace: Developing a Paranoid Obsession-Part II," Asian Defence
Journal, February 1990, p. 36. India was aware thhat the
proposal was directed at New Delhi. While it supported the
concept, Indian officials attempted to create a zone of peace
"which would allow India a dominant role in the region."
K. Subrahmanyam, "Arms Limitation in the Indian
Ocean," Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and
American Perspectives, eds. Selig S. Harrison and K.
Subrahmanyam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1919), p.
223.
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force bases, are exfuded. The area should also be free
of nuclear weapons.
New Delhi considers any external actor to adversely
impact India's ability to influence regional events. In 1971,
the United States began construction of a communications
facility on Diego Garcia. With the continuing development of
Diego Garcia, the U.S. military presence on Diego Garcia,
strategically positioned in the Indian Ocean, has become a
major irritation in U.S.-India relations.
Indian leaders have consistently opposed U.S.
expansion of military facilities on Diego Garcia. As early as
1974, Indian Foreign Minister Singh stated that it was "a
matter of great concern," and that:
Our view is quite clear. We have told the Americans that
the bringing in of naval units, including aircraft
carriers, in this region without any ostensible
objectives, has caused concern to all littoral countries,
including India, and that this type of show of force will
never be relished by any country in the rfgion. We have
adopted a clear and categorical position.
New Delhi used the international principle of freedom
of navigation to explain the Soviet naval presence in the
region, since the Soviets have no operational bases in the
Indian Ocean. Conversely, India sees Diego Garcia as a
potential U.S. nuclear base. Since the Indians aspire to be
3? As quoted by Subrahmanyam, "Arms Limitation in the
Indian Ocean," p. 225.
"United States Plan to Set Up Island Base is Chilling
Relations with India," New York Times, February 8, 1974, p. 1.
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the dominant regional power and fear U.S. nuclear strength,
they actively pursue diplomatic efforts to create an Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace.
India recognizes that uninhibited movement through the
Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) is necessary for all
nations. All nations have legitimate interests in all oceans,
whether for oil access or other trade.
The original Zone of Peace resolution, pertaining to
the water surface, was acceptable and was viewed by India as
a "worthwhile arms control measure."39  Subsequent crises
over oil and oil prices made implementation of the proposal
virtually inconceivable. Subrahmanyam cites lack of
implementation as causing as "an acute sense of insecurity and
security dependence on great powers--especially the United
States."
,4
As stated earlier, India initially looked more
favorably toward the United States during the Carter
Administration. President Carter proposed the
demilitarization of the Indian Ocean during a new conference
on 9 March 1977, but ten days later modified the statement,
calling for "mutual military restraint in the Indian
39 Subrahmanyam, "Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean,"
p. 230.
40 Subrahmanyam, "Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean,"
p. 230.
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Ocean."41 The Soviets likely favored keeping Soviet vessels
in the region, since that would theoretically reduce the U.S.
threat from the Indian Ocean. Once again, New Delhi and
Moscow shared a mutual interest: if the United States
positioned nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean, then both New
Delhi and Moscow saw benefits in having a Soviet presence in
the area.
Today, it is most unlikely that New Delhi actually
wants to restrict its naval activity in the Indian Ocean.4
For other regional powers, this could mean that India intends
to act as the regional "policeman." However, the smaller
nations in the region continue to attempt to draw external
actors into regional affairs, suggesting their fear of Indian
dominance.
In seeking neutralization of the Indian Ocean, New
Delhi's objectives remain: Indian naval military growth and
the elimination of foreign military bases and the elimination
of external naval forces in the Indian Ocean. India's focus
is likely to be to the west without, however, ignoring the
military significance of Port Blair in the Andaman Islands in
41 Subrahmanyam, "Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean,"
p. 231.
Walter K. Anderson, "Emerging Security Issues in the
Indian Ocean: An American Perspective," Superpower Rivalry in
the Indian Ocean: Indian and American Perpectives, eds. Selig
S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989), p. 56.
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the eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean. As Chapter IV
suggests, India's naval buildup will undoubtably allow for
increased opportunity to strengthen Indian military and
political influence throughout the Indian Ocean.
For the United States, freedom of navigation remains
a top priority, and to ensure it with the necessity of naval
strength. India, too, views naval force as essential for
power projection in the Indian Ocean. Convergence of mutual
interests between the two nations does exist including freedom
of navigation, access to oil in West Asia, and safeguarding
the sea lanes of communication. Nevertheless, despite some
mutual interests, they are overshadowed by areas of
confrontation, particularly concerning the neutralization of
the Indian Ocean. With its growing military-industrial
complex, India is positioning the Indian Navy to play an
increasingly significant regional role. Thus, the prospect of
continuing security threats in the Persian Gulf and the Red
Sea will, in all likelihood, adversely affect the U.S.-India
relationship as objectives diverge on the waters of the Indian
Ocean.
5. Nuclear Weapons
Initially the United States and India had been
involved in the development of nuclear power for commercial
purposes in India since the 1963 Tarapur Atomic Power Station
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(TAPS) Agreement. When China joined the "nuclear club" in
1964, Indian interest shifted from commercial to military
application of nuclear technology.
In 1972, Indira Gandhi announced that India intended
to test a nuclear device for peaceful purposes. The nuclear
explosion at Pokharan on 17 May 1974, successfully
demonstrated India's ability, bringing it too into the
"nuclear club." The United States claimed that India had
violated the TAPS agreement by diverting heavy water intended
for the power plant to the nuclear weapons program.
Washington's unilateral decision to suspend transfer of
additional heavy water to India was strongly protested by New
Delhi." India quickly turned to the Soviets for the heavy
water required to operate the power station. Once again,
opportunity surfaced for the USSR. In response, the United
States ended its nuclear cooperation agreement with New Delhi.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in the United States
required that if, after 18 months, the recipient of nuclear
assistance bad not accepted international inspection and
'safeguards' to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,
43 Surjit Mansingh, "The Reluctant Duo: What India
Expected of America," Asian Affairs: An American Review,
Winter 1988-89, p. 210. India joined the International Atomic
Energy Agency in 1955. Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program
encouraged additional research.
" Vijay Sen Budhraj, "The Politics of Transfer of
Nuclear Technology: A Case Study of the Tarapur Agreement,"
Australian Outlook, April 1984, pp. 21-25.
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American aid would be stopped.45  India still views this as
an attempt to further interfere with its national security.
Indeed, New Delhi sees that all countries are entitled
to arm themselves as they see fit, including nuclear
46
weapons. To date, the issue of nuclear proliferation
remains a source of dispute between Washington and New
Delhi. 47
B. CONCLUSION
A threat to the Indian Ocean region by another major
power, such as the Soviet Union or China, increased U.S.
concern in regional activities, as demonstrated in 1962 when
China invaded India and in 1979 when the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan. When the threat to U.S. interests was minimal or
some other region posed a greater impact on the United States,
Washington's attention naturally refocused elsewhere. Today,
as different centers of power are rising and the Cold War is
fading. Thus a change in U.S. interest in the region is once
again occurring.
45 Hardgrave, India: Government and Politics, p. 252.
The safeguards were post-hoc U.S. requirements.
46 Subrahmanyam, "Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean,"
p. 228.
47 Budhraj, "The Politics of Transfer of Nuclear
Technology: A Case Study of the Tarapur Agreement," p. 23.
Washington has however agreed that France could supply heavy
water to India in 1984.
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U.S. regional goals, which are influenced by global
considerations, impact on South Asia and Indian Ocean policies
in several ways. Primary American interests include
protecting the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), enhancing
the security of Persian Gulf shipping, maintaining a regional
balance of power, denying influence to other major powers,
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and regional stability.
Secondary political concerns include the perception of India
as potentially offering a model for post-colonial political
development, along with American humanitarian concerns in the
region.
Despite a range of mutual interests in development,
business, acad.,kt , and cultural realms, and despite shared
beliefs in the principles of democracy. The United States has
been reluctant to put India at the center of its South Asian
policy. Perhaps unrealistically, India expected support from
the United States for its domestic and international goals:
peace, independence, nonalignment, and international
cooperation. At independence the enthusiastic new Indian
government saw its special global role: as a peacemaker.
Being a former colony, with "similar" experiences to other
developing countries who achieved independence following World
War II, the Indians presumed U.S. officials would minimally
listen to their suggestions and comments. 8 However, New
48 Mansingh, "The Reluctant Duo," p. 206.
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Delhi was unable to grasp the determined cold war waged
between Wasahington and Moscow. In many ways, New Delhi
seriously underestimated American resolve to resist the Soviet
Union. Indeed, India did not appreciate that U.S. regional
policy is made from the viewpoint of a global actor,
consequently it is likely to be frequently at odds with the
dominant regional player.
As this review of U.S.-India relations indicates,
misperceptions and unfulfilled expectations have resulted in
disharmony between the two nations. With the United States'
post-World War II foreign policy emerging, regional
involvement was based primarily on containment of communism.
Conversely, India's ambitions were based first on Nehruistic
globalism, later on evolving regional power projection.
This chapter also indicated, continual efforts are
required by Washington and New Delhi to develop mutually
favorable relations. The key points of contention outlined in
this chapter -- relations with Pakistan, China and the Soviet
Union, the neutralization of the Indian Ocean, and nuclear
proliferation -- will continue to impact U.S.-India relations.
Nevertheless, the changing strategic and political
environment may provide a catalyst for improving relations in
some of these areas. A definite shift in U.S. relations can
be noted in two areas: Pakistan and the Soviet Union. As U.S.
policy objectives become similar to New Delhi's interests and
expectations, the foundation for an improved relationship may
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be found. Of course, China remains a questionable area of
contention. It will be important to note how India perceives
continuing importance of the political ties between the PRC
and the United States. Since the India-PRC rivalry still
exists, their relations could become antagonistic. The areas
of Indian Ocean neutralization and proliferation of nuclear
weapons will continue to be major points of contention. With
continuing U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean, especially in
light of the current crisis in the Middle East, the United
States military is unlikely to withdraw from the region.
Additionally, both Washington and New Delhi have made their
positions clear regarding nuclear proliferation, with little
probability for negotiation in the foreseeable future. A
completely harmonious relationship between the United States
and India thus should not be expected.
To better facilitate understanding the complexities of the
U.S.-India relationship, it is necessary to examine India's
most critical bilateral relationship, ties to the Soviet
Union. In developing its power base, India turned
increasingly to the Soviets for support. However, India's
"Soviet option" brought it into increasing conflict with the
United States. In effect, India found the United States a
stumbling block in attaining New Delhi's policy objectives.
Chapter III will thus evaluate the development of the Indo-
Soviet relationship and the implications for further growth in
the 1990s under Gorbachev's new foreign policy agenda.
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III. INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS: CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS
DEVELOPING A POWER BASE
New leader' have radically changed approaches to foreign
policy between India and the Soviet Union. Josef Stalin's
death greatly impacted Indo-Soviet relations which were
virtually non-existent prior to 1953. Nikita Khrushchev's new
approach to the Third World and foreign policy resulted in
opening relations with New Delhi. Today, Mikhail Gorbachev
has again taken steps in his new foreign policy strategy.
This chapter seeks first to determine whether the Indo-
Soviet relationship is a "limited partnership," essentially a
commercial relationship, or a "client association" similar to
Cuba or Vietnam; second, to ascertain the Soviet impact on the
Indian Naval buildup, including the impact the relationship
has on Indian Naval power projection capability; and finally
speculate on the extent to which and to what effect the
changes within the Soviet Union will have on the Indo-Soviet
relationship.
A. EARLY YEARS OF INDO-SOVIET POLITICAL TIES: 1947-64
On numerous occasions, India provided political support to
the Soviets. Their association has not been an overt
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alliance, but has given the appearance of growing involvement.
As the needs of New Delhi expanded, so did the relationship.
The Indo-Soviet relationship began soon after Stalin's
death in March 1953. Prior to Stalin's death, Soviet contact
with India was limited. Stalin, suspicious of the British,
wanted nothing to do with their "imperialist puppet." New
Delhi, on the other hand, did not develop an explicit foreign
policy until 1950, preoccupied during the early years after
independence with internal issues.
In an effort to reduce political isolation, the Soviets
became more receptive to the non-aligned movement in August
1953 as Khrushchev embarked on a new foreign policy approach.
Soviet attempts to support a non-aligned country resulted in
its first comprehensive trade agreement with India in
December. India obt.ined significant economic concessions
which provided for payment in rupees and the use of Indian
shipping. The agreement also proviCed for cultural exchanges
between the two countries.49
The visits and trade agieement met India's requirements at
the time. As a new nation, New Delhi had almost unlimited
needs for economic assist&nce but uncertain political needs.
Lacking a complete understanding of its new power, New Delhi
saw only a limited basis for relations with the USSR.
49 Khalilzad et al., Security in Southe--n Asia, p. 74.
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In bilateral relations, India felt it was not treated as
seriously as it should be. As the last chapter indicated,
U.S. policies toward the region created an opportunity for the
Soviets; the United States provided limited economic and
political support for the new democracy, slighting India from
what New Delhi felt was its appropriate "great" power
status. The United States was not seen as sensitive to the
political realities of the new nation or to Indian
nationalism, whereas the Soviets were viewed more responsive
to Indian needs.
Consequently, regional events and attitudes set the stage
for expansion of Indo-Soviet relations. The trigger was the
1954 U.S. military assistance program to Pakistan,
Washington's action became one more factor in India's decision
to move forward with the Soviet trade agreement. Nehru
regarded U.S. military aid as an interventionist act in
regional affairs and did not accept the assistance in the
global sense of containment.51  For India, Soviet influence
balanced the American presence in South Asia. With both
superpowers represented in the region, India would be the
decisive factor in South Asian affairs. The presence of the
50 Mansingh, " The Reluctant Duo," p. 206.
51 Khalilzad et al., Security in South Asia, p. 74.
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two superpower rivals in the region presents a danger of
confrontation as the powers compete for influence.52
New Delhi and Moscow quietly developed a pattern of
diplomatically aiding causes to each other's benefit. On 23
June 1955, Nehru and Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin issued a
joint communique, pressing for international recognition of
the People's Republic of China and reaffirming compliance to
the Five Principles of Coexistence.53 The communique stated
a "good-neighbors" policy while denouncing "imperialism." The
two nations evidently saw "ample scope for the development of
cultural, economic and technical cooperation." 54 When
Khrushchev and Bulganin visited New Delhi in late 1955, they
expressed complete support of Indian foreign policy, including
New Delhi's position regarding Kashmir and Goa and anti-
Western sentiments voiced in Indian speeches. The visit
concluded with a major agreement for increased trade, a
promise of Soviet assisted oil exploration and construction of
52 Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., India Under Pressure:
Prospects for Political Stability (Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1984), p. 169.
53 Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy Toward India:
Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1974), p. 114; William Norman Brown, The
United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 376. The
five principles include mutual respect, nonaggression,
noninterference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence.
54 Donaldson, Soviet Policy Toward India, p. 115.
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a hydroelectric plant. In addition, the Indians and Soviets
had found areas of similar interest: disarmament, Indochina,
and China's "right" to a seat at the United Nations.55
With Pakistan signing the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) only
five months before the agreement, the impact of global
politics on regional actors nudged India closer to the Soviet
Union's direction. Thus, as Pakistan found the United States,
India found the USSR.
Although Nehru remained committed to nonalignment, Indian
foreign policy clearly tilted at times toward the Soviet
Union. The Indians and Soviets had found areas of
cooperation, not only politically, but economically. Nehru
did not criticize the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and
was the only member of the non-aligned movement who voted
against the U.S.-sponsored UN resolution calling for Soviet
withdrawal of troops from Hungary in November 1956.56  The
Congress Party criticized Nehru for his "overcautious, almost
apologetic reaction to Soviet imperialism." 57 As a result of
domestic political pressure, Nehru's later comments became
55 Joint Statement by the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR N.A. Bulganin and the Prime Minister of
India Jawaharlal Nehru as quoted in Donaldson, Soviet Policy
Toward India, p. 115.
56 All NAM members, with the exception of India,
abstained from the vote.
57 As quoted in Khalilzad et al., Security in Southern
Asia, p. 78.
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more critical of Soviet action, referring to the Hungarian
government as "imposed." India denounced the Soviet activity
for violating the Five Principles of Peaceful coexistence.
To minimize the harm to their relations, Moscow extended
Rs 600 million credit for industrial equipment and aid for
public sector projects. Despite deepening economic ties to
the Soviets, Nehru rejected both the communist and capitalist
models for Indian economic development, opting for a mixed
economy by merging basic concepts of both models.
As Sino-Soviet relations waned in the late 1950s, Nehru's
criticism of the Soviets became less evident, with Nehru
moderating his remarks as Sino-Indian tension escalated. As
Nehru perceived the regional affairs, the Soviets were not
only a balance to the United States, but also to China.
Consequently, the Soviets could be used, hopefully, to
restrain Chinese aggression. However, as Sino-Soviet
relations deteriorated, Moscow's position as the sole
determinant of the communist bloc's foreign policy was
significantly reduced.
India needed a strong Soviet counterbalance to the
Chinese, as tensions over border issues continued to
intensify. When China invaded India in October 1962, the very
foundation of New Delhi's foreign and military policies was
brought into question. In an action sobering to India, the
Soviet Union reacted to the 1962 Sino-Indian Border Conflict
with five days of silence over the incursion. Then on 25
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October 1962, a Soviet editorial supported China's offer to
resolve the border issue using the "line of actual control."
Confronted with a defeated military and limited Soviet
support, India was forced to "accept" China's position along
the border.
The Indo-Chinese conflict began at the height of the Cuban
Missile Crisis. During the crisis Khrushchev attempted to
ensure at least tacit support from China and the appearance of
communist bloc unity as a bargaining tool against the United
States. Consequently, it was only after tension over the
Cuban Missile Crisis diminished that Moscow returned to its
"neutral" position, publicly taking neither side, but
continuing to support arms transfers to and heavy industry
projects in India.
Military aid from both the East and the West flowed into
the area following the Border War with China. As Indo-Soviet
relations began to expand, India turned more and more to the
Soviets in a variety of areas. By doing so, India obtained
several benefits: concessionary terms; technology transfer;
and help in building an indigenous production capability.
Diversification of aid lent credibility to India's
nonalignment posture.
The Sino-Soviet rift played a large role in the Soviet
shift from political neutrality during the 1962 conflict. The
Soviets were motivated to improve relations with India as
Sino-Soviet ties weakened and the West continued its policy of
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isolating the USSR. If India, in its strategic position to
the south, tilted to the West (the British and Americans were
providing significant military assistance to India to counter
the Chinese communist threat) the USSR could become encircled
by the Western allies. A key Soviet goal was thus to increase
India's independence from the West.
Nehru provided close cooperation with Khrushchev. Both
leaders continued to look for common interests, reinforcing
and expanding ties to strengthen the relationship throughout
the early 1960s. Nehru's death in May 1964 marked the end of
the formative phase of the Indo-Soviet relationship.58
B. INDIRA GANDHI AND THE SOVIET UNION: 1965-84
During the Nehru years, the Soviets provided tangible
international support for New Delhi's foreign policy by
backing India's claim on Goa and Kashmir. However, two
seemingly unconnected global events in October 1964 impacted
the region: Khrushchev was ousted from the Soviet leadership;
and, China exploded its first nuclear bomb. India's strategic
environment had radically changed, almost overnight. China,
already possessing a demonstrated military superiority over
India, had now acquired the potential to devastate India. At
the same time the Soviet counterweight had to reconsidered,
given the new Brezhnev leadership.
58 Khalilzad et al., Security in Southern Asia, p. 82.
40
The Soviets reassured New Delhi that the USSR's policy
towards India remained unchanged. The Soviets continued to
support New Delhi's foreign policy, as well as expand
bilateral economic relations. In 1964-1965, Soviet assistance
amounted to $500 million each year, including a 1.5-2 million
ton capacity steel plant promised to India in 1964.59
The Soviets remained neutral in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War
over Kashmir. They pushed for a resolution, expressing
concern over the proximity to Soviet borders and the potential
escalation of the conflict. The USSR, supported by the United
States, pressed for a United Nations resolution calling for a
ceasefire in September 1965.
Following the 1965 Indo-Pakistan ceasefire, the Soviets
mediated a peace agreement between Pakistan and India in the
central Asian city of Tashkent. Britain ruled itself out from
the peacemaker role; India and Pakistan were angered by
the U.S. arms embargo; and China had overtly backed Pakistan.
Soviet involvement in the resolution process allowed Moscow to
strengthen favorable relations with both countries.
Signs of closer Indo-Soviet ties quickly appeared. In
July 1966, during a trip to Moscow, India's new Prime
59 Khalilzad, et al., Security in Southern Asia, p. 81.
60 S. Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear (Maryland: The
Riverdale Company, Inc., 1986), p. 50. British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson had originally condemned India's "aggression" to
which he later apologized to Indira Gandhi in April 1966.
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Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, adjusted her stance on Vietnam and
called for an "immediate unconditional halt to American
bombing."61  In the same month, when Pakistan's air chief
visited Moscow, he failed to secure an anticipated arms
transfer package. Subsequently, a new Indo-Soviet trade
agreement was signed in December 1966, with plans to double
trade between the two countries by 1971.
Although India disagreed with the "equal distance" Soviet
posture toward Pakistan and India during its conflicts with
Pakistan, New Delhi maintained favorable relations with
Moscow. It was not until April 1968 that Pakistan made its
first significant arms deal with the USSR.
Reliance on Soviet economic assistance may have been the
reason for India's muted response in August 1968 to the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, New Delhi was
neither directly affected nor threatened by the invasion.
However, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had hoped that the
Soviets would withdraw their forces. 6 New Delhi could be
seen as acting in its own interest and consequently not
jeopardizing its prized relations with Moscow. A dilemma
existed, however, for New Delhi. Espousing a leadership role
in the Non-aligned Movement, India's response to Soviet action
61 Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, p. 58.
6 Singh, The Yogi and the Bear, p. 59.
Khalilzad et al., Security in Southern Asia, p. 89.
42
left doubt in the minds of other nations as to New Delhi's
non-alignment.
Like her father, Mrs. Gandhi envisioned a high-profile
international role for India. Nevertheless, Nehru had
maintained distance between himself and the Soviets. Indira,
conversely, attempted to involve the Soviets deeply in the
region, using Soviet involvement to support her in domestic
Indian politics. Of course, this approach posed an additional
dilemma for Indira in terms of neutrality in the Indian Ocean
and Indian desires to keep the great powers out of the region.
Although India thought it could control the Soviet presence,
that was not always to be the case.
The early 1970s significantly impacted the regional
strategic environment. First, with Sino-American talks in
July 1971, India felt increasingly isolated. Henry Kissinger
had used India's primary adversary, Pakistan, to facilitate
Chinese-American rapprochement. The United States had
strongly supported India in 1962, and remained neutral during
the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. However, New
Delhi could no longer depend on United States support or
neutrality in the event of a war with either of its two main
adversaries, Pakistan or China. Indian officials began to see
a strengthening, triangular relationship among Pakistan, the
PRC and the United States. The increased isolation felt by
Van Hollen, "The Tilt Revisited," p. 343.
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India pushed New Delhi to consider closer ties with the Soviet
Union. 65
Secondly, the civil war in East Pakistan generated intense
pressure on India. Pakistani refugees created domestic
instability in India. The Soviets, providing international
support for India, pressed Pakistan to end the "bloodshed and
repression," calling for a diplomatic resolution to the
situation. India determined that military action would be
needed to achieve its goals. Military action in turn,
required a continual flow of Soviet arms.
With a tense regional environment as the backdrop, India
and the Soviet Union concluded their treaty discussions. On 9
August 1971, the USSR and India signed a twenty-year Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.67 The Soviets were able
to use the treaty as a stop toward an Asian collective
security agreement and to justify their security role in the
area. 6  However, the treaty did not commit Soviet forces to
military action. The treaty also balanced the growing
political ties between the United States, Pakistan and China,
65 Hardgrave, India: Government and Politics, p. 251.
Khalilzad et al., Security in Southern Asia, p. 89.
67 For a copy of the treaty text see Donaldson, Soviet
Policy Toward India, pp. 267-269.
India did not support the Soviet collective security
proposal in 1971. The Indian response to the Soviet concept
of Asian-Pacific security has continued to be generally
unenthusiastic.
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without entirely impeding India's ability for independent
action. It is important to emphasize that Indira apparently
did not perceive the treaty as a change in New Delhi's
nonalignment policy.69  The political leverage which the
treaty provided depended largely on the strategic environment.
With the signing of the treaty, the Soviet's primary gain
was the countering of American and Chinese influence in the
region and enhanced exchanges and trade with India. Soviet
objectives in the Indian Ocean included having a year-round
maritime route from European Russia to the Far Eastern portion
of the USSR; developing the ability to support "friendly
regimes; neutralizing the American potential to pose a threat
to the Soviets; and acquiring a capability for SLOC
interdiction.
When Indira visited Moscow in September 1971, the Soviets
publicly backed New Delhi's position on East Pakistan and
increased arms transfers to India. For India, the Soviet arms
transfers provided a reliable source to ensure its military
capability. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin visited
New Delhi, and in November, Moscow acknowledged that the East
69 See Article 4 of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty.
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Pakistani refugees were "no longer an internal affair of
Pakistan.
"
After 14 days of fighting, East Pakistan insurgents and
the Indian army overpowered Pakistani soldiers, taking 90,000
prisoners.71 The Soviets vetoed a UN resolution calling for
a ceasefire. New Delhi perceived the Soviets as a reliable
partner during the hostilities, balancing United States or PRC
intervention on behalf of Pakistan. India's victory
established the nation's regional predominance and boosted
regional perceptions of Indian strength and India as a
potential threat. Although the Soviets had supported India,
New Delhi reiterated its non-aligned status.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had little
direct impact on Indo-Soviet relations. New Delhi tilted
towards Moscow in its comments and avoided public condemnation
of Soviet actions. India opted to abstain from the vote on a
UN resolution denouncing the Soviet invasion. Since the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) countries and the Islamic conference
condemned the Soviet invasion, New Delhi confronted a new
dilemma. Although India sought to continue being recognized
70 Khalilzad et al., Security in Southern Asia, p. 92;
Donaldson, Soviet Policy Toward India, p. 230. India felt
that the solution to the problem would requirp the military.
Here the Soviets supported India; Soviet action did not
denounce military intervention and ensured India would be
well-armed.
71 Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, p. 220.
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as a non-aligned nation, India's action was perceived with
suspicion.
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan surprise New
Delhi since Moscow did not officially inform New Delhi of
Soviet intentions prior to the invasion. The U.S. response co
the Soviet action was the rearming of Pakistan to contain the
USSR. The quantity of arms to Pakistan increased along with
the modernization of its military equipment. However, the
U.S. action raised Indian security concerns. Thus the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan was indirectly a cause of India's
perception of an increased threat to its security in the
1980s. American rearming of Pakistan, understandable in light
of American geostrategic concerns, reduced India's numerical
and technical superiority, changing the military and political
balance in South Asia.
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Indira felt that U.S. assistance to Pakistan was
disproportionate to the situation. 7 From New Delhi's
perspective the rearming of Pakistan was part of a series of
unwanted American actions including the 1970s expansion of
Diego Garcia and Sino-American rapprochement. These events
meant an escalating U.S. involvement in the region. Thus,
with both Soviets and Americans in the Indian Ocean, India was
72 See Appendix A for summary of Pakistan and India force
strength in 1990.
73 Khalilzad et al., Security in Southern Asia, p. 112.
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completely thwarted in its goal of keeping the superpowers out
of the region.
On the positive side for New Delhi, the nation's security
was enhanced through increased Soviet arms to India. During
the 8-11 December 1979 ,isit to New Delhi, Soviet leader,
Leonid Brezhnev agreed to & military and an economic package
with India -- again making the military relationship the glue
that cemented their ties.
During the same time period the Soviets offered MiG-25s to
India. However, New Delhi demanded top-of-the-line technology
from Moscow and received it. The arms package included MiG-
29s and MiG-31s in addition to indigenous production of the
MiG-29s. This was a dramatic signal of the importance that
Moscow placed on the Indian relationship.
Clearly, Afghanistan posed a dilemma for India. India saw
Afghanistan, strategically positioned in South Asia, as part
of its sphere of influence. The Soviets were thus viewed as
an intruder in the region. However, both India and the USSR
wanted to minimize outside foreign powers from dominating the
Indian Ocean region, thereby shariing a common interest.
India's stance on Afghanistan cost New Delhi prestige,
compromising its position among non-aligned nations. To its
benefit, India was reassured of reliable Soviet military and
political support.
The Soviet withdrawal thus improves Indo-Soviet relations
and eliminates an embarrassing contradiction for New Delhi in
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the Non-Aligned Movement. In fact, Soviet actions in both
withdrawing from Afghanistan and improving relations with
China dramatically increased India's foreign policy options:
New Delhi was now unfettered to try to improve its relations
with Beijing.
C. INDO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
The previous sections reviewed the political-economic
association which resulted from Indo-Soviet military ties.
This section will examine, more specifically, the military
relationship between New Delhi and Moscow. As will be
indicated in Chapter IV, India has developed a military force
with both Western and Soviet equipment.
1. Evolving Military Ties: 1960-79
In 1960, India made its first major military purchase
of Soviet equipment which included 16 AN-12 air freighters, 26
Mi-4 helicopters and 24 Il-14 transports. The military
relationship, which dominates the Indo-Soviet relationship,
began to expand between 1962 and 1964. A drift toward the
Soviets can be especially noted following the 1962 border
conflict with China. A sale of MiG-21s followed in August
1962 and an aircraft construction plant for indigenous
74 Nikita Khrushchev made his second visit to India in
February 1960, on the 10th anniversary of the Chinese-Soviet
Friendship Alliance. The equipment sale was followed by
delivery during 1961-1962.
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production was contracted with the Soviets.75 "India is the
only country in the Third World to have been given the right
to produce Soviet state-of-the-art weapons under license.'"
76
In a largely Western military (British training, organization
and equipment), the Indian Army did not fully support its
government's purchase of Soviet rilitary equipment. The
diversification of arms suppliers, however, resulted not only
in favorable terms with the Soviets and the development of
indigenous production of military equipment, but politically
agreed with India's policy of non-alignment.
In December 1964, the Indian Defense Minister
requested the loan of three Daring Class destroyers. The
British offered New Delhi the older Weapon Class ship and
World War II submarines. India also requested F-104
Starfighters and C-130 transport aircraft from the United
States. The United States refused India's request. India
accepted the Soviet proposal for Petya Class frigates. The
following year, India agreed to the delivery of four Soviet
75 The USSR sold only MiG-19s to the PRC and had not
offered the sale of MiG-21s prior to the proposal to India.
The MiG-21s, however, did not arrive in India before the
Chinese invasion of India in 1962. India was also the first
foreign government to receive Soviet MiG-29s and the Charlie
SSGN in the 1980s.
76 Brzoska and Ohlson, Arms Transfer to the Third World,
1971-1985 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, for SIPRI, 1971),
p. 34. See also Ramesh Thakur, "India as a Regional
Seapower," Asian Defence Journal, May 1990, pp. 4-17.
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submarines by 1970. New Delhi continued to expand it Soviet
weaponry inventory.
At the out break of Indo-Pakistani hostilities in
1965, the West placed an arms embargo on both countries. By
contrast, the USSR proved to be a reliable supplier,
sensitive, responsive and eager to meet Indian needs.
2. Indian Military Modernization and Expansion
When the Janata coalition took power in New Delhi in
1977, the government embarked on diversification of military
equipment. When Indira Gandhi returned to the Prime
Ministership in 1980, she continued the diversification trend
with purchases of Sea Harrier aircraft, Sea King helicopters
and Sea Eagle missiles from the UK; Mirage 2000 fighters from
France; and SSK-1500 submarines from West Germany. From the
Soviets in June 1980, India agreed to a $1.6 billion deal for
ships and missiles with repayment over 17 years at a
concessionary 2.5% interest rate. Clearly, Soviet weaponry
and financing had not lost its attractiveness. A 1982 arms
transfer deal totalled $3 billion. In May 1986, India
purchased twenty-six Dornier 228 aircraft from West Germany.
The sale included three directly purchased aircraft with
twenty-three under license for manufacture by Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) at Kanpur.
7 Thakur, "India as a Regional Seapower," p. 14.
51
India acquired direct benefits through its arms
diversification, such as more advanced technology and
negotiated favorable terms, but indirect benefits appear to be
just as significant. Supply diversification could pressure
the Soviets to improve their terms. Increasing competition in
a buyer's market has resulted in concessionary counter-offers
for more sophisticated military equipment. License for Indian
production of Soviet equipment would also allow for
installation of non-Soviet weapons systems. A continual
attraction of Soviet arms is that India can upgrade its
facilities vice build a completely new factory to produce new
systems. Once again, purchasing Soviet equipment would result
in a lower unit cost with a production license than if Western
equipment was bought off the shelf.
Several events in 1986 occurring cumulatively pushed
India ever closer to the Soviets. First, during 25-28
November 1986, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
flew to India and Pakistan. While in New Delhi, Weinberger
expressed sympathy for Indian concerns regarding the rearming
of Pakistan, but at his next stop in Islamabad, he extended a
deal to Pakistan for AWACS aircraft, M1 Abrams tanks, F-16
fighters, and upgraded avionics for Chinese produced aircraft
in the Pakistani inventory. "New Delhi's long-standing
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paranoia of a U.S.-Pakistani-Chinese axis bearing down on its
security interest was activated."7
8
Second, during his 1986 visit, Mikhail Gorbachev
offered Kilo and Tango submarines, and TU-142 Bear maritime
reconnaissance aircraft to India. Indian Defense Minister
K.C. Pant visited the Soviet Union in February 1988, securing
a prized offer for Soviet designs of an Indian indigenously
built aircraft carrier. In September 198C, Soviet Defense
Minister Dimitri Yazov referred to the recent arms transfer
agreements as a "quantum leap" in the Indo-Soviet military
relationship, demonstrating the Soviets' positive attitude and
emphasis toward India's self-reliance and indigenous
production policies. (See Table 3.1 for Soviet origin
equipment for the Indian military.) Minimally, Indian
purchases of Soviet equipment have provided New Delhi with
flexibility in technological development and indigenous
construction. In reality, Soviet military assistance to India
has provided the critical basis for India's regional power
projection capability.
From New Delhi's viewpoint, the Indo-Soviet military
relationship is based on four major factors: areas of common
78 Jyotinmoy Banerji, "Moscow's Indian Alliance,"
Problems of Communism, January-February 1987, p. 1.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 October 1988, p. 35.




PRINCIPAL INDIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT
(SOVIET ORIGIN)
ARMY
* 3150 Main Battle Tanks
T-72 (1500)
T-55 (700)
T-80 (unknown number delivered)
* Various Surface-to-Air Missiles
SA-6; SA-7: SA-8A/B; SA-9
AIR FORCE
* 28 attack squadrons with MiG-21s, MiG-23s,
and MiG-27s
* 22 fighter squadrons with MiG-21s, MiG-23s,
and MiG-29s
* 12 Mi-25 Helicopters
* 6 MiG-25R and 2 MiG-25U aircraft
* Various transport aircraft
Mi-24 Hind
Mi-26 Halo
* Various AAM; ASM; and SAM
NAVY
* 1 SSGN; 14 SS Submarines
* 5 Kashin DDG
* 8 Petya
* 8 Corvettes
* 9 Amphibious Ships
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Military Balance: 1989-1990 (Brassey's 1989), pp. 159-160.
interest with the USSR; defense technology transfer; favorable
credit terms; and good prices. The thrust to India's foreign
policy in the region is its opposition to U.S.-USSR rivalry in
the Indian Ocean and its drive to establish Indian naval
control. A dilemma for New Delhi remains. Although
diversification is politically acceptable, in reality,
suppliers are limited. The Indians are developing an
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indigenous capability, but are presently limited in production
and technology, requiring continued purchases from another
nation, the USSR.
For the Soviets, political objectives rather than
military ones are the major factor in the relationship.
Unlike its bilateral relationships with other Third World
countries, in which the Soviets have provided arms in exchange
for overflight and landing rights, port access, bases, and
equipment prepositioning, India has not approved such access
for the Soviets. However, the Soviets have been successful in
a political-military sense through a substantial weakening of
American presence and influence in New Delhi.
D. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Since 1971, the Indian government has enjoyed a "special
relationship" with the Soviet government which provides
military equipment in exchange for Indian consumer goods.
India's relations with the Soviet Union currently constitute
New Delhi's most critical bilateral relationship and must
therefore be considered by U.S. policymakers. This chapter
has examined India's "alliance" with the Soviets, and has
argued that the core of the relationship is essentially
military, although it also includes important political and
economic support for New Delhi in its struggle as an emerging
power.
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In view of this "special relationship" in the context of
the dynamic international situation, India must reevaluate its
relationships with all of the world's major powers: China has
an aging leadership, a struggling economy, and unsettled
political conditions; Pakistan lost some U.S. support as the
Soviet threat dropped; and the Soviet Union confronts its
economic problems and changes in military force structure but
will it continue to be a reliable partner in arms equipment?
India's assessment of Mikhail Gorbachev is a vital issue.
Fears existed that Gorbachev would "sell out the Third World
(and India) in his desperation to propitiate the West.... (and)
equally jittery about the impact of the Soviet new thinking on
Indo-Soviet relations and India's standing in the world. "s
New Delhi's concern initially centered on Sino-Soviet
rapprochement and a resulting possible negative impact on
Indo-Soviet relations. Improving Sino-Indian relations,
however, helped to diminish fears. Nevertheless, changing
Soviet relations with Pakistan and Sino-Soviet rapprochement
may well alter Soviet-Indian relations. A shift in Soviet
focus toward China could place Indian interests in a secondary
position.
Of equal importance is a -:.calculation by New Delhi and
Moscow of the merits of their "special relationship" in light
C. Raja Mohan, "Analyst Reviews Progress of Indo-
Soviet Relations," The Hindu, 8 August 1990, p. 8.
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of dynamic internal economic and military shifts. Two
concerns are uppermost in the minds of Indian officials: as
U.S.-USSR relations continue to improve, Moscow relegates its
security, economic and political relations with India;
secondly, the decreased Soviet threat to the West "means the
loss of countervailing power for India in its dealings with
the West."
81
Changes in the political environment apparently have not
damaged ties as the Indians may have feared. Indian Prime
Minister Singh's visit to Moscow in July 1990 was described as
"highly satisfactory," quelling doubts on issues affecting New
Delhi.8
Overall, a significant shift in Indo-Soviet ties can be
expected under the following conditions: the Soviets attempt
to increase their presence in the region; Soviet-Chinese
leaders greatly improve relations; the Soviet economy
drastically deteriorates; or the American presence declines.
It is conceivable that the Sino-Soviet ties will continue to
improve. As the Soviets attempt to move towards a market
economy, it is also conceivable that the economy will
deteriorate as it adjusts to the system.
81 Mohan, "Analyst Reviews Progress of Indo-Soviet
Relations," p. 8.
K.K. Katyal, "Moscow Visit Ends an Uncertain Phase,"
The Hindu, 26 July 1990, p. 1.
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On the other hand, the remaining conditions are less
likely. Soviet military presence in the region has declined,
while American military posturing in the Indian Ocean area has
actually increased due to the current Middle East crisis.
Given the present realities India will probably continue
its amicable relationship with the Soviets as long as New
Delhi is unrestrained in its predominant regional role.8 As
the political environment changes, new opportunities for Indo-
Soviet relations occur. The possibility exists for Soviet-
Indian military exercises and contacts. Corresponding
opportunities also exist for U.S.-India military exercises and
port visits.
E. CONCLUSION
India should not be seen as Moscow's agent, client or
surrogate in South Asia. New Delhi and Moscow continue to
enjoy a "special relationship" despite changes in the top
leadership of both nations. However, this does not preclude
future shifts in the relationship. Gorbachev has modified the
Soviet approach to foreign policy as well as stimulated
political and economic reform in his own country. If the
Soviet economy becomes increasingly more "westernized," the
Periodic strains have included post-Tashkent fallout;
Soviet pressure for India to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty; Moscow publishing maps "conforming to the Chinese
version" of the Sino-Indian border; Indian rejection of the
Asian Collective Security concept; and difficulties with
public sector projects in India.
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Indian government may see less in the way of the economic
benefits in its essentially military relationship with the
Soviets. India used the Indo-Soviet relationship to develop
its regional power base, especially militarily, as an
instrument of foreign policy. At this point the relationship
is still useful. Moscow has gained not only economic
benefits, but perhaps more significantly, political prestige
and the denial of American influence. Although India has
benefited from a valuable military relationship, a dilemma
remains for New Delhi. As the Soviets reduce their presence,
the relative U.S. military strength increases in the Indian
Ocean region. The current strategic environment adversely
impacts New Delhi's goal of eliminating external actors from
regional events. Chapter IV will discuss India's military
buildup and options available for India's success as a
regional power.
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IV. INDIA'S GROWING DEFENSE CAPABILITIES: THREAT OR SAVIOR?
Changes in India's internal security and external
strategic environment have led not only to a shift in India's
foreign policy but also in its national and regional defense
requirements. The changing regional strategic environment and
India's own aspirations as a nation are reflected in India's
military buildup and foreign policy.
The chapter begins by providing a very brief background on
India's industrial base. Section A will review selected
aspects of the economy's industrial development as it impacts
on India's military and India's rise to regional dominance.
This assessment seeks to determine whether India can continue
its military buildup--and at what cost. Section B will
examine the Indian military strength and the impact of its
buildup. Although the emphasis of this chapter is naval
development, background information on the army and the air
force is necessary to compare with the naval buildup, as well
as a concise assessment of defense expenditures. Finally, as
India drives to provide leadership in South Asia, the chapter
will look at whether India feels it has a reserved right to
intervene in neighboring countries. This final section will
explore issues which may impact on India's ability to be the
decisive leader of the region.
60
A. BACKGROUND
India is the predominant regional power in South Asia.
India occupies the geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean
region; acting as the fulcrum of the subcontinent land mass.
India's agricultural output exceeds internal consumption
requirements, and India exports its grain surplus while
maintaining a healthy reserve to support the population during
famines. The country is able to produce ninety percent of its
coal and sixty percent of its petroleum requirements and
almost 100% of the iron ore bauxite, manganese and uranium
requirements. 8 As a growing industrial power, India has
been able to sustain a six percent annual rate of economic
growth between 1976-86. Growth over 1988-89 has dropped
slightly to just over five percent. To support the growing
industrial base and economy, India maintains the world's third
largest pool of scientists and engineers, and the fourth
largest standing army. India's nuclear and satellite
launching capability give it an expanding power projection
potential.
In its quest for national security and regional
predominance, India blazed the trail in the nonaligned
movement (NAM), maintaining its NAM leadership position even
84 Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power (New Delhi:
Sage Publications, 1984), p. 271.
85 Raju Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986).
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after tilting toward the Soviet Union. Although the
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Peace meant troubled
relations for India with the United States, Pakistan and
China, for India, the treaty meant security. The treaty with
the Soviets was the basis for the military growth of the 1970s
and critical to the more rapid buildup of the 1980s.
B. MILITARY BUILDUP
Although the bulk of this chapter deals with India's naval
development, a general assessment of military force is
required in order to understand India's perceptions of its
strategic environment and regional perceptions of India.
Several motives might explain India's military buildup: first,
a fear of Pakistan; second, the changing strategic
environment; and third, India's own aspirations as a nation.
Despite past problems in India's economic development,
India's mixed economy has resulted in significant achievements
since independenr. Exceptional success has been accomplished
in agricultural production, which in turn has allowed the
growing economy to support technological research and
development (R&D). Progress in armaments in turn has been
strengthened by an earlier emphasis on industrial development,
development now being used to support military growth and
production. Thus, India's relative prosperity and purpose
have supported movement toward the national objective of
self-reliance.
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India's emerging economic power is reflected in the
current strengthening of its military. The British legacy
still greatly influences the Indian Army and that tradition
had immensely affected civilian elite decisionmaking during
the early post-independence period. British officials
stressed "separate spheres" of influence between the civil
service and Indian military officers with the civilians
dominating the decisionmaking process and limiting the
military involvement in decisionmaking. The military was
divided into three branches under the Defence Minister in
1947. It was not until 1962 that Prime Minister Nehru
strengthened the military position. As discussed in Chapter
II, Nehru shifted priorities to modernize India's defense
capability. 87
As the British maintained "separate spheres" of military
and civilian influence, today's Indian military remains
relatively uninvolved ii, civilian politics. Nevertheless, a
political understanding is essential at the higher command
positions.
86 Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to
the Development of a Nation (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1971), p. 29.
87 This strengthening resulted from the Chinese invasion
of India in 1962.
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1. Indian Army and Air Force
Army composition and structure have changed from the
days of the British Raj, but still fundamentally reflect the
British Indian Army. Infantry battalions are composed of
pure, mixed and totally mixed companies. "Pure" companies are
comprised of Gurkhas or Sikhs, for example, while "mixed"
companies reflect different ethnic groups. Three attempts
have been made toward total integration of the army. Such
integration would allow for continued unit integrity in the
event a number of service members would not fight in a civil
disturbance in their region.
Generally, the government has minimized employing the
army in civil conflicts, yet a countervailing trend is
evident. This trend can be seen in both counter-insurgency
efforts in the Northeast, as well as New Delhi's use of the
military in Kashmir and the Punjab. The army's missions
include not only internal security, but also safeguarding
Indian borders from external threats. As India's major
perceived threats include China and Pakistan, for Indian
planners a larger Indian army is required to guard against a
potential two front war.
During the struggle for independence, Mahatma Gandhi
saw no need for a military force. Yet, the Kashmir, Hyderabad
and Goa experiences all proved to Nehru that there was a real
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need for the military. And in 1962, the Sino-Indian Border
War changed Nehru's anti-colonial nonalignment stance.
Non-aligned India in reality was a de facto U.S. "ally,"
allowing the United States to establish a Military Assistance
Group (MAG) and conduct joint U.S.-Commonwealth-India
exercises. 
89
India's strategic environment drastically changed
after the Sino-Indian Border Conflict. This conflict proved
to be a watershed for the Army. As indicated in Chapter II,
Defence Minister Krishna Menon had maintained the force in a
weak state on the Northeast border, while most of the Indian
troops faced Pakistan. Chinese soldiers breached the
seemingly impenetrable Himalayan passes, pouncing on a totally
unprepared Indian Army. The 1962 war changed the importance
of the defense policy. The military now had two fronts;
Pakistan was not India's only challenge in the region.
Before the Chinese invasion, Nehru believed that a
weak military force was an opportunity to reinforce his view
of non-alignment and a non-aggressive policy. He seemed to
feel that a weak military would keep his newly created nation
88 Hardgrave, India: Government and Politics in a
Developing Country, pp. 42-43; Barnds, India, Pakistan, and
the Great Powers, pp. 119, 121. Minor internal conflicts
occurred during the early years of independence: Pakistan and
India fought a brief war over Kashmir (1948). Hyderabad
(1948) yielded after a "police action." Goa (1961) was under
colonial rule before forcible inclusion in greater India.
89 Joint air exercises were held in 1963.
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free of war. As a consequence of the Chinese invasion, a
number of significant changes occurred: the military became a
popular career for the growing middle class; the army doubled
its force size; and both the Navy and Air Force grew to adapt
to shifts in defense attitudes. The result was modernization
of forces, planning, and R&D; Army troops were no longer
merely border guards.
Although the Chinese attack in 1962 ended in military
humiliation for the Indian Army, two more wars were to be
fought in the next seven years. India effectively
demonstrated the use of its growing military strength. The
1965 Pakistan-Indian War ended in a stalemate, but by 1971,
the Indian military achieved superiority over Pakistan.
Politically, India won by "crushing the oppressive Pakistani
leader" in 1971 where, as the stories of Pakistani repression
reached the western portion of the country, the war damaged
the government's image. India made a strategic gain in that
it temporarily reduced a major military opponent to a minor
power.
Since independence, India has maintained a policy of
encouraging indigenous production with selected weapon
imports. General K. Sunderji, former Commander-in-Chief,
feels that the Army's strength is in the numbers (force size)
and in mobility:
We are keen to develop our own systems indigenously and
look to imports only when we are forced to, our
acquisitions do tend to lag behind those of potential
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adversaries in those areas Vd also impose a severe drain
on our available resources.
Although New Delhi has succeeded in obtaining weaponry
from both the Soviet Union and western countries, India has
had difficulty keeping pace with western technology and has
experienced problems in translating indigenous R&D into
hardware. In the past, this problem has been in part due to
the government's red tape and a shortage of "production
engineers. , ,91
The second portion of Gen. Sunderji's statement refers
to "potential adversaries." Realistically, Pakistan, as a
potential threat, is far from being "ahead" of India. The
Hindu, in a recent comparison of Pakistani and Indian military
forces, indicated that in quantity, India far out-numbers the
Pakistan military. On the other hand, as a result of U.S.
arms transfers to Pakistan, Islamabad has considerably
improved the quality of Pakistani armed forces equipment.9
9 Pushpindar Singh, "The Indian Army Today: Colour and
Firepower," Asian Defence Journal, April 1987, p. 23.
"India: Indigenous Programs Flourish Amid Defense
Modernization," International Defense Review, April 1986, p.
436. According to the author of the article, New Delhi has
been working towards a solution and established an increasing
role for the private sector.
92 The Hindu is a national paper, published in Madras.
93 "Pakistan's Proxy War in Kashmir," The Hindu
International Edition, 26 May 1990, p. 9. See Appendix A for
detailed comparison.
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As the Indian Army has modernized, the demand for high
technology has grown. The country produces battlefield
surveillance radars and the army radio engineered network
(AREN) communications system. At least two factors contribute
to India's modernization of the army: the need to maintain
combat readiness vis-a-vis potential adversaries, and cost
effectiveness. General Sunderji sees another potential
factor, one which so far has apparently been avoided,
"upgrading for the sake of upgrading."94
Infantry regiments are also equipped with machine
guns, howitzers, and mortars in addition to the Carl Gustav
84mm anti-tank weapon, 106mm RCL guns (on jeeps) SS-11-Bl and
Milan wire guided anti-tank missiles. The infantry has seen
inc-eased mechanization in the past 15 years. Armored
Peisonnel Carriers (APCs) were first introduced in the 1971
Indo-Pakistan conflict; now India produces a Soviet model
BMP-2 infantry combat vehicle. Following the 1965 conflict,
where Indian tank regiments were outclassed (suitable only for
police action), the Indian government contracted for
Soiriet-built T-54 tanks. Establishing a heavy vehicles
factory, the Indian government today produces the "Arjun" main
battle tank (MBT) -hich will replace the current armored
equipment during the 1990s. As indicated on page 54, Soviet
94 Singh, "The Indian Army Today," p. 23.
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origin equipment in the Indian Army and Air Force is also very
significant.
In addition to the army, the Indians maintain a
sizeable and formidable Air Force. The most significant
addition to the Indian Air Force is the MiG-29. This aircraft
uses top-of-the-line technology which at the time of the first
sale, was not even available for export to the Warsaw Pact
nations.95  India's purchase came as the Pakistanis had
received renewed U.S. military assistance including the
acquisition of F-16s. New Delhi had been negotiating with the
United States to purchase F-16s, but selected the MiG-29s at
a better price and received the desired complete technology
package from the Soviets.
As with the Army, India's Air Force has been
diversifying its equipment acquisition. Purchases have
included not only Soviet aircraft, but France's Mirage 2000s
(Vajras) and Britain's Harriers. HAL produces most avionic
and navigational aids, and some air defense systems
improvements.
2. Indian Naval Buildup
Historically, Indian military pride has rested with
its Army; India did not have its own naval heritage.
This is not the first incident of Soviet arms
transfers to non-Warsaw Pact countries prior to listing on the
East Bloc or Chinese order of battle. Other examples include
the sale of MiG-21s, MiG-25s, and MiG-27s to India.
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Throughout the colonial period, Great Britain sailed the seas,
providing security for India from naval attack. Consequently,
the Indian military had little background or experience in
establishing a naval force. Without an indigenous historical
legacy the Navy received minimal political and economic
support. However, since the early 1980s the Navy has been
working diligently to build up its two fleets and modernize
the force. Force modernization works to support an expanding
naval role to secure India's seaboards which extend over 7500
miles. 9 Given the uncertain future environment, Indian
defense analysts see today's naval mission as four-fold:
1. To safeguard the Indian coastline and vital
installations in the vicinity of the coastline against
both surface and submarine threats.
2. To safeguard the flow of trade into and out of Indian
ports during limited war situations.
3. To restrict the naval activities of the potential
adversary during limited war.
4. To be in a position to assist islaLd republics of the
Indian Ocean--notably Mauritius, the Seychelles, Sri
Lanka--in case they seek Indian as;,istance,
particularly against threats of subversion.
M.P. Awati, "Emerging Security Issues in the Indian
Ocean: An Indian Perspective," Superpower Rivalry in the
Indian Ocean: Indian and American Perspectives (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 104. See Appendix B for
Indian power projection map.
97 Awati, "Emerging Security Issues," p. 104. The 1987-
1990 Sri Lankan intervention illustrates the mission.
Additionally, the Seychelles and the Maldives have been
subjected to coup attempts since 1982.
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Throughout the 1960s, the Navy's budget allocation
remained at four percent of the total Indian defense
budget.98  Just as the 1962 Sino-Indian Border Dispute
resulted in a shift in national priorities in favor of the
Army, the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis provided a watershed for the
Indian Navy. First, the Navy recognized shortcomings in
tactics and secondly, the crisis demonstrated che importance
of having a maritime power projection capability. Maritime
power in turn works hand in glove with India's overall goals
of international recognition, prestige and power projection in
the region.
However, an effective naval power projection must
include a fully trained marine force. The lack of an
amphibious capability (highlighted during the 1971 conflict)
has not yet been resolved. A dedicated, well-trained
amphibious force remains an important determinant in power
projection. One major constraint on acquiring this capability
can be attributed to Army-Navy rivalry. The army's stand is
firm; "any line battalion with a crash course in dry and wet
shod training is capable of carrying out marine
operations." Despite recognizing the need for amphibious
98 Awati, "Emerging Security Issues," p. 101.
An attempted amphibious landing at Cox Bazar in 1971
tragically ended after an amphibious ship sent Gurkha troops
to their death, drowned in what was supposed to be waist high
water.
100 Awati, "Emerging Security Issues," p. 107.
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capability, the Ministry of Defence waited until 1986 to
organize the first of its marine regiments. The military is
taking significant steps to address this limitation and is
forming a second marine unit.
The Indian naval buildup has resulted in not only top-
of-the-line Soviet transfers, but has focused on two other
important components of arms expansion: diversification of
sources and indigenous construction. The following table
illustrates a tilt toward foreign naval purchases, with some
diversion from traditional purchases solely from the Soviet
Union.101  Purchases from Moscow generally accommodate India
by way of technology transfer and licensing for local
production.
As evidenced by Table 4.1, the Soviets have provided
extensively to the Indian Navy, including destroyers,
frigates, corvettes, amphibious craft, submarines and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) units. Although one of India's
priorities is indigenous production, there is a lack of
capability in the production of naval vessels. Efforts also
include designs for aircraft carriers, but India's ultimate
goal is independent designs with indigenously developed
technology. In 1989, Indian naval acquisitions from the
India's major arms suppliers expenditures from 1976-
1985 include (1985 US$ million): USSR--$10,064; UK--$2,465;
France--$1,070; US--$137. Calculated from figures provided in
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Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance: 1989-1990, pp. 159.160.
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Soviets included three additional diesel submarines, with two
more anticipated this year (1990). Likewise, New Delhi
has received five corvettes and four more are expected for
delivery in 1990. Purchases from South Korea included three
offshore patrol craft.
For several reasons, India is working to diversify its
arms sources. Diversification allows for an improved Indian
negotiating position during arms sales discussions. Secondly,
New Delhi may be unsure of continued reliable support from
Moscow. Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has announced
reduced support for arms transfers to the Third World,
although there is little evidence that such a policy change
has occurred. With international issues possibly becoming
more North-South issues, vice East-West, India could, at some
point, be in opposition to the USSR. Thirdly, the West has
technology which the Indians need for indigenous construction
and design. One current example is French-Indian discussion
to explore the possibility of selling the French Dassault
Rafale-M to New Delhi for its new aircraft carriers. India is
also contemplating a Light Combat Aircraft of French assisted
design.10
102 The Indian Navy is likely to continue expansion of its
submarine force with diesel boats vice nuclear powered
submarines.
103 Tony Banks, ed. "Country Survey: India," Jane's
Defense Weekly, 26 May 1990, p. 1035.
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Thus, India is apt to continue with its current policy
of purchasing Soviet equipment, with limited purchases from
the West. The Soviets have been willing to provide technology
transfer to the Indians, which has made Soviet equipment an
attractive purchase, in addition to the generally lower
prices. More recently though, New Delhi chose France's
proposal over both the Soviet and British plans for India's
ambition--to build a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. A Navy
official has indicated that no commitment had been made in the
design of the aircraft carrier.14  Nevertheless,
considerable debate is likely to generate a decision in favor
of a nuclear power plant for India aaircraft carriers.
10 5
Soviet technology development will inevitably determine the
type of aircraft and carrier built in the next 15 years.
Technology transfer is evidence that the Soviet-Indian
relationship is a productive partnership. It is India's way
of meeting its own intermediate desire for technology.
India has an active indigenous construction program to
support Indian naval expansion plans. Indian efforts include
104 Arun Prakash, "A Carrier Force for the Indian Navy:
Rational and Options," paper delivered at Naval War College,
4 May 1990, pp. 16-17.
105 Prakash, "A Carrier Force for the Indian Navy," pp.
19-20.
106 The Indian Navy anticipates production of at least
three aircraft carriers in the next 15 years.
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submarines, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, amphibious craft
and patrol craft as shown on Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2
INDIAN SHIPYARD CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS 1988-89
GARDEN REACH SHIPBUILDERS:
FFG: 3 (unnamed) 'Project 16' design
FFLG/Corvette: 8 (6 unnamed) "Khukri" Class
LCP: 4 "Lurssen 45" Class
LST: 1 Gharial, "Margar" Class
AOR: 1 Rajaba Gan Palan, Bremer-Vukan design
AGOR: 2 "Sankhayak" Class
1 (unnamed) New Type
GOA SHIPYARD:
LCP: 4 (1 unnamed) "Vikram"/Type 95- (For Coast Guard)
HINDUSTAN SHIPYARD:
LCP: 5 "Neptune"/Tacoma design
MAZAGON DOCKYARD:
SS: 2 (1 unnamed) "209/Type 1500"
DDG: 1 (unnamed) 'Project 15' design
(first of three planned)
FFLG: 2 "Khukri" Class
(added units to be ordered in 1990-92)
LCP: 3 (2 unnamed) "Neptune"/Tacoma design
AG: 1 Diving support ship
Source: Thakur, "India as a Regional Seapower," p. 6.
This does not mean that New Delhi has shelved
purchasing foreign equipment. On the contrary, due to a lag
in technology, fewer resources and a slowing economy, India
will continue to acquire the most recent, technically advanced
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submarines, minesweepers, and maritime aircraft from foreign
107
sources.
The Indian buildup will ensure its predominant
position as a regional power in the Indian Ocean. For some
states, this may constitute a security concern. Captain
Richard Sharpe, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships 1990-91
volume, has recently expressed considerable concern about
India's naval buildup:
Apologists for the program point out that India is an
insecure country, with an abiding sense of the fragility
of the Indian Union, and that 'nly military strength can
give it the self-confidence needed to take the risks
necessary to put its relations with neighboring states on
a secure footing... There has also been what looks like an
orchestrated attempt by various Indian nationals, writing
in journals to understate the significance of the naval
expansion. For different reasons, the military incursions
into Sri Lanka and the Maldives were both justified, but
the willingness to project power has caused a tremor of
anxiety as far away as the eastern ASEAN states and rather
stronger reactions in the other Indian Ocean island groups
o: the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles.
I. the search for control of natural resources in the
region, India clearly intends to be 4 a strong position
when the time comes to exploit them.
As referred to above, the suppression of the attempted
coup in the Maldives illustrated a significant rapid reaction
and logistical support by Indian military forces. New Delhi
demonstrated a growing long-range airlift capacity which is,
107 Denis Warner, "Jane's Startling Look at Moscow and New
Delhi," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, July 1990, p. 37.
108 Warner, "Jane's Startling Look at Moscow and New
Delhi," p. 37.
77
to date, exceeded only by the Soviet Union and the United
States.
One November 3, 1988, two Maldivians, aided by 400
Tamil mercenaries attempted to overthrow Maldivian President
Gayoom. Escaping from the Presidential Palace, President
Gayoom requested assistance from the United States, United
Kingdom, India, and Pakistan. After deciding on a military
course of action, New Delhi informed The South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) members, the
United States and USSR of India's decision.110  Within six
hours, the 50th 'Para' Brigade (approximately 300 personnel)
was on the move from India to Male, the Maldivian capital. By
5 November, India had lifted 3000 soldiers to the island. Two
days is, indeed, quite a capability for a developing country.
The mercenaries attempted a sea retreat on the Progress Light.
The INS Godavari and INS Betwa sailed toward the mercenaries'
vessel, engaging the Progress Light about 90 kilometers from
Colombo, Sri Lanka. The mercenaries surrendered on 6
November.
Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, justified the
mil1tary action as:
1 Gregory Copley, "South Asia: Zone of the New Great
Powers," Defense and Foreign Affairs, May/June 1989, p. 9.
110 SAARC includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
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.a commitment to the promotion of peace and
stability...in keeping with our belief that countries in
the region can resolve their problems in a spirit of
friendship and cooperation, free of outside
influences.
Prime Minister Gandhi responded to the fears of neighboring
states: "Are we to sit back and watch a democratically elected
government of a friendly, neighbouring country being pulled
down by alien forces? No."' 12 India clearly sees a role for
itself in the region despite its neighbors' fear of spreading
Indian hegemony. New Delhi's view of its actions is
articulated in its version of the Monroe ("Rajiv") doctrine:
1. No country in South Asia should seek military aid from
external powers.
2. No external power should intervene in disputes between
South Asian states or in the domestic problems of
those states.
3. No South Asian state other than India shouM
arbitrate the disputes and problems in South Asia.
Although India's action was requested by President Gayoom and
India cited Article 1(C) of the SAARC charter to intervene on
the Maldivians' behalf, smaller nations remain concerned for
their own security.114 Whether the Indian military will use
ill Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 November 1988, p. 15.
112 The Hindu, 19 November 1988, p. 1.
113 S. Bilveer, "Operation Cactus: India's 'Prompt Action'
in Maldives," Asian Defense Journal, February 1989, p. 33.
114 The Charter's Article 1(C) states "To promote and
strengthen self-reliance among the countries of South Asia."
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its strength and organizational capability in power projection
to overthrow as well as save a government, will be seen in
future regional crises. India, for the present, appears to be
in a position to act as the regional "police force."
India's intentions continue to be translated into
action by rising defense spending and in current construction
projects. Ravi Rikhye writes that the fourth period of Indian
Naval expansion began in 1978, adding not only Soviet
weaponry, but also Indian built and Western purchased ships
and aircraft.11
5
When released, India's 1985 Defense Plan drew
considerable interest. Indian military involvement in the
region has also caused international focus on India's growing
naval capabilities.116  Although smaller regional nations
express concern over India's naval expansion, India has tended
to play down its capability in the wake of these concerns.
115 Ravi Rikhye, "Nobody Asked Me, But..." Proceedings,
March 1990, p. 77. The first perlod of expansion was from
1947-1956 with British equipment. The second period from
1956-1962 was in part, a reaction to CENTO and SEATO, drove
New Delhi to ensure a 3:1 ratio over the Pakistan Navy. The
third period was from 1966-72 as a result of the Sino-Indian
conflict in 1962 and the 1965 Indian-Pakistani War. With
cheap Soviet credit, Navy purchases included eight Foxtrot
submarines, ten Petya corvettes, ten Osa missile boats and
support ships.
116 Examples of growing capability and willingness to use
force was demonstrated in the 1986-87 mobilization against
Pakistan; 1988 Maldives intervention; Sri Lankan intervention;
1990 crisis with Pakistan over Kashmir.
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3. Assessing Mid-Term Indian Naval Development
The Indian Navy is the only force in the littoral
region with two aircraft carriers with solid plans to increase
the total to five by 2005.117 India also plans to double its
frigate force by 1995 and construct new bases at Karwar (south
of Bombay) and the Andaman Islands. Naval construction is
becoming more indigenous, incorporating Soviet, British,
German, Dutch, and French technologies. India's frigate force
includes the British designed Leander class (six built in
India) and the Indian designed Godavari class; corvettes are
built in India using French designs. The recent purchase of
the second aircraft carrier is only an intermediate step to
indigenous production of "air-capable" ships. India has
acquired its first Soviet-built Kilo class submarine,
replacing the Foxtrot submarines. India has also purchased
German submarines and has built a number of boats using German
designs. In addition to the acquisition of their first
Charlie I SSGN from the Soviets in 1988, India and the USSR
are arranging a lease for an additional three (possibly four)
Charlie submarines in the near term. Additionally, India is
also attempting to develop its own nuclear propulsion system
117 Rikhye, "Nobody," p. 78. By the year 2000, the author
projects the following expansion: two to five aircraft
carriers (projecting the loss of one carrier); 16 of 24
submarines; 40 major surface combatants, mostly corvettes.
Rikhye does not identify what, if any, assistance will be
provided by the Soviets.
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for the fleet, although diesel submarine propulsion appears
more viable for India.
Regardless of New Delhi's intentions, Admiral Ram
Tahilani, former Navy Chief, has planned for three to five
aircraft carriers, 40 major surface combatants and 24
submarines by the year 2000.118 For now, a third carrier is
expected to be commissioned by 1997. It will probably replace
one of the aging carriers currently in the fleet. Rikhye sees
the goal of 24 submarines as unobtainable in the next ten
years due to cancellation of the indigenous construction
program for Type-209 boats for domestic political reasons.119
Asian Defence Journal, however, indicates that two Type-209
submarines are under construction.120  With today's Kilos,
Type-209s and possibly four leased Soviet SSGNs, it is
conceivable that the Indians could well be on their way to the
desired total by the year 2000. However, construction plans
do not indicate the attainment of that goal through indigenous
building.
India's power projection is not without limitations.
The bulk of naval spending is in purchasing new equipment and
not maintenance. Rikhye writes that the Navy's capabilities
are limited by short duration (14 days) on station and a two
118 Rikhye, "Nobody," p. 77.
119 Rikhye, "Nobody," p. 78.
12 Thakur, "India as a Regional Power," p. 10.
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week limit on steaming time. 121 The shortage mainly appears
to be in support. Rikhye also cites shortage of spare parts
and personnel, ground ciews and pilots.
However, two points should be noted. First, India's
last major war with Pakistan in 1971 was less than two weeks.
Additionally, the Maldives intervention was less than four
days. Therefore, the Navy's fourteen day limit would not be
a concern if comparable "conflicts" were fought. Secondly,
similar arguments regarding fleet readiness or limitations
have been made in the past. Similar claims were made about
the United Kingdom prior to the Falklands. Thus, India, with
its limitations, continues to work toward what Indian analysts
see as a "superpower navy," certainly the most powerful in
South Asia today.
12
In an attempt to compensate for perceived
"deficiencies," the Indian defense budget has grown
significantly since the early Nehru days, but even more
noticeable is the military growth since 1982. Overall, the
defense budget as a percent of Gross National Product (GNP)
remained relatively constant through 1987, fluctuating between
3.5% and 3.9% of the GNP.1 3 Allocations within the military
121 Rikhye, "Nobody," p. 78.
122 Additional aircraft carriers and a strengthened
submarine force are two areas of needed expansion and
modernization.
123 See Appendix C for a comparison of defense spending by
India and its neighbors.
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have shifted slightly with the Air Force and Department of
Defence Production and Supplies receiving cuts in the 1988
budget. Arguments have existed over allocation amounts to
Research and Development, but as defense programs are
increasingly able to produce equipment indigenously, improved
military efficiency and modernization expenditures will become
a more acceptable use of funds. One possible solution to this
disagreement would be to purchase the high technology
equipment and reduce costly indigenous production of high
value items. Thus, top-of-the-line technology could be
purchased and R&D could use already available data.124
With defense plans to increase mobility and modernize,
the budget allocation reflects the growth. In 1982, the
Navy's share was 11.26% (compared with 4% in thhe 1960s), by
1987 it rose to 13.2%, and 1988 figures at 13.55%, reflecting
the planned steady increase to twenty percent over the next
ten years.125
C. EMERGING ISSUES
Regional issues in South Asia continue to concern India
and its neighbors. The boom in arms sales in South and
124 This may be viewed as a compromise of "independence,"
but it appears that India has been previously willing to
"overlook" this to attain its intermediate objectives to
obtain needed technology.
125 Copley, "South Asia: Zone of the New Great Powers," p.
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Southeast Asia seems to be a trend not easily curbed. Nuclear
capability, as well as other potential forms of weaponry, draw
concern from smaller nations. In light of increased tension
in the region, perhaps SAARC, as a diplomatic forum, may calm
some fears. It could potentially be an effective tool to
diffuse and resolve difficult problems.
Concern exists about India as a cause of regional arms
buildup in South and Southeast Asia. The nuclear issue in
particular continues to worry many external leaders. The main
anxiety of those nations already possessing nuclear capability
lies in proliferation, while some Third World nations, such as
India, see it as a power tool to aid their countries to
counterbalance an adversary or a step towards major power
status.
The nuclear threat posed in South Asia is an extremely
sensitive issue. It may well be that India always intended to
develop a nuclear capability. On the other hand, India may
have viewed nuclear power in only peaceful applications until
it saw a new threat from the PRC. When China exploded a
nuclear device in 1964, India was "pushed" into developing a
nuclear weapons capability. India exploded its nuclear device
in 1974. Unsure of a major power nuclear umbrella, Pakistan
now appears to have the capability to develop tactical nuclear
weapons, although not officially acknowledging its capability.
Once again, the nuclear issue has created an uncertainty.
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Nuclear weapons might well be a source for regional
instability.
Although New Delhi continues to say that its nuzlear power
is for "peaceful purposes," the country has developed a
potential delivery system. In 1989, India test-fired its
first Agni intermediate surface-to-surface ballistic missile
(IRBM), bringing India into the "IRBM club." It may soon have
an intercontinental ballistic missile capability with its
126
current ability to produce nuclear weapons. With a 1500
mile range, the IRBM is capable of reaching throughout South
Asia and into the PRC.
South and Southeast Asian countries are wary of the
uncertain future -- stability and growth or increased conflict
and fear. Concern exists among the smaller nations in
Southeast Asia with the potential reduction of the U.S.
military presence in the region and the Indian Naval
buildup.127  Consequently several of these South and
Southeast Asian countries are developing their own militaries
through arms buildup and modernization.
128
126 China, France, Israel, the USSR and the United States
are countries which have an IRBM capability.
127 Gregory Copleyy, "The New Era," Defense and Foreign
Affairs, March 1990, p. 13.
128 Gwen Robinson, "Arms Boom in Asia," Pacific Defence
Reporter, June 1990, pp. 45-46; Iftikhar H. Malik, "The
Pakistan-U.S. Security Relationship: Testing Bilateralism,"
Asian Survey, March 1990, pp. 289-290.
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SAARC may be a way to relax some tension in the region,
but the smaller nations need reassurance that India is not
going to "bully" them. Although unlikely at present, SAARC
could provide an acceptable starting point for Indian
confidence-building measures. The Indians provided responsive
assistance to the Maldives government when it requested
assistance during the 1987 coup. India also aided the Sri
Lankan government, but recently removed Indian troops from the
island after considerable pressure from the Sri Lankan
government. 129
D. CONCLUSION
India is concerned with threats to its security and
regional role. Tts growing economic base permitted the recent
military buildup. The slowing economy since 1987 has caused
some to doubt the projected growth rate of the military,
particularly the ambitious Naval program. Nevertheless,
despite slow economic growth, military expenditures continue
to increase in real terms. Both the Army and Navy received
higher allocations.10
129 See Mohammed Ayoob, "India in South Asia," World
Policy Journal, Winter 1989-90, p. 123. The Sri Lanka
government requested New Delhi's assistance to fight
insargents in Sri Lanka.
130 Increased spending could be attributed to the army
which is normally more labor intensive than technology
oriented. Additionally, military activity in Sri Lanka and
Kashmir may account for a significant portion of the increase.
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New Delhi has not balked at the use of force in Indian
foreign policy. Indian leaders have had a historical concern
for regional predominance. Early examples include the 1947
fight for Kashmir and incorporation of the Indian princely
states, and the 1961 battle for Goa, while more recent cases
include Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. India has maintained a
high profile during the 1980s and its neighbors have begun to
express concern over India's growing military strength. Since
1971, India has been striving to build a first class navy. It
correctly analyzed the importance of seapower and apparently
agreed with Mahan's factors that make seapower development
possible. Even though Indian leaders did not recognize
the importance of seapower during the early years of
independence, they did feel that Britain's legacy to them was
not only legitimacy of self-government, but legitimacy as the
regional powerbroker. This legitimacy appears, in turn, to be
translated into reserving the right to intervene, as in the
Maldives and Sri Lanka. Among other purposes, intervention
has demonstrated the naval forces' regional power projection
capability to promote or defend democracy as in the case of
the Maldives, and failure in dealing with the insurgency in
the case of Sri Lanka.
131 A.T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-
1783, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), Chapter 1.
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With projected expansion of its naval forces, India may
ennance its mobilization capability through a third naval base
and fleet at the southern tip of India. 132  There is also
likely to be an expansion of the two current fleets,
especially the western fleet and submarine force. This would
solve logistics problems, increasing effectiveness and provide
security for surface vessels. India could project its
influence not only to the south, but provide flexibility
eastward or westward. Even if the force would not grow, the
military would be more effective.
As India enhances its military capability and options, it
poses a dilemma for New Delhi, as it generates greater concern
in South and Southeast Asia. Perhaps, with its slowing
economy, India could focus more attention on economic ties in
the changing strategic environment. Developing working
relationships to foster a more economically stable region
should be one of India's first steps in confidence-building
measures. India dominates the region, but the promotion of
SAARC in South and Southeast Asia could lead to improved
relations, and subsequently, diminish regional tension.
Currently, India's military expansion has reinforced fears
among smaller nations in the region. For these nations, a
significant drawdown of U.S. military presence enhances
132 See Appendix D for Indian military installations.
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regional concerns that India might act "uninhibited" as the
regional hegemonic power.
The Indian Navy increases New Delhi's options and tools of
foreign policy. As an effective tool, India must learn how to
build the confidence of its neighbors without appearing to
menace regional governments.
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V. PROSPECTS FOR RELATIONS IN THE 1990s
India is rapidly developing into a major regional power,
capable of influencing events throughout the Indian Ocean
region. A growing military capability sets India in a
stronger regional negotiating position. However, New Delhi
must improve its regional bilateral relations. As a regional
leader, India must also look outward, to develop a deeper
understanding of the global aspect of bilateral relations in
today's new environment.
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to provide an
overall assessment of Indian military development and how it
may impact future relations with the United States. The
chapter will begin with a summary of the key points in the
previous chapters and conclude with a brief indication of the
prospects for India's power projection capability and possible
new directions for the U.S.-India relationship in the 1990s.
A. KEY POINTS
As discussed in Chapter II, five key areas have adversely
affected the United States-India relationship. Two
interrelated areas of contention, the Soviet Union and
Pakistan, may now be key areas from which to develop increased
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harmony, and provide starting points to work on mutual
interests.
U.S. policy towards Pakistan has been dominated by the
Soviet threat and America's commitment to containing
communism. Pakistan's role in U.S. foreign policy has
diminished as the Soviet threat has declines. Diminishing
U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the post-Cold War has eased
Washington's concern over India's tilt toward the Soviet
Union, creating an opportunity for better U.S.-India
relations.
Under present conditions, China remains an issue which
will not significantly affect U.S.-India relations. In the
past, the United States has tended to be pro-Chinese in
foreign policy considerations. Nevertheless, as China's
position as the fulcrum in the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle
becomes less critical for world stability, other bilateral
relationships may take on new significance. The fragile
relationship between the PRC and India still rests on a
foundation of unresolved issues which have in the past
resulted in armed violence between the two countries.
Two key points of contention in U.S.-India relations
examined in this thesis will remain throughout the 1990s:
neutralization of the Indian Ocean and India's nuclear weapons
capability. The United States is a commercial, maritime power
which depends on the uninhibited use of the world's oceans to
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maintain its economic health. India, as a regional power,
wants to be the dominant force in the Indian Ocean region.
Since the turn of the century, the United States has never
accepted a regional power to provide security for U.S.
interests since the turn of the century. Thus, until
Washington can be convinced that it can rely on India to
safeguard SLOCs and provide regional stability, a U.S.
military presence will remain in the region.
Since India's nuclear explosion in 1974, New Delhi has had
a nuclear weapon capability. India's refusal to sign the NPT
makes it a potential source for other Third World nations to
acquire a nuclear capability. The United States is strongly
opposed to the further spread of nuclear weapons. Until this
critical issue is resolved, closer military ties are unlikely.
The Indo-Soviet military relationship is likely to change
in the near future due to the economic difficulties in the
Soviet Union and the resulting force reductions in Europe.
The Indian military is heavily weighted toward Soviet
hardware. Although the Army and the Air Force are capable of
indigenous production, the Navy construction program is not
currently as active in producing its own hulls.
For sustained power projection capability, P strong
economy is necessary. India's economic growth soared in the
1980s. In relation to defense spending, recent constraints on
the economy have not curtailed military expeaditures. Since
most of India's defense spending is focued on technology and
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light industry, defense expenditures may have positively
impacted India's growth and investment.133
As a result of government spending decisions, India has
been in an position to develop its military option, especially
its naval forces, as a foreign policy tool. The Indian Navy
aids New Delhi as it strives to attain India's "regional"
policy objectives. To garner increasing prestige, New Delhi
flexes not only a conventional force, but also its nuclear
capability option.134
As insecurity mounts in the region, the smaller nations
will need reassurance that India is not going to attempt to
"bully" them; SAARC may be one way to relax some of the
tension in the region.135  While focusing on economic,
cultural, and technological endeavors, smaller nation members
might be able to use SAARC as a tool in dealing with India's
regional predominance. However, until the organization can
successfully contend with controversial bilateral issues, the
133 Robert E. Looney, "The Socio-Economic Impact of
Defense Expenditures in the Middle East and South Asia,"
unpublished paper, 20 September 1990, p. 29.
S. Bilveer, "AGNI: India Fires into the Missile Age,"
Asian Defence Journal, September 1989, p. 76.
135 Rohitashwa Dubey, "Indophobia as the Ailment of
SAARC," in The Indian Journal of Political Science, January-
March 1988, p. 72. The thrust for developing SAARC lies not
only in an interest in generating prosperity, but member
countries hoped that the organization would provide a
"regional voice" in the United Nations.
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utility of SAARC as a forum for solving political differences
will be minimal.
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B. UNITED STATES AND INDIA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Except for the 1962-65 period, the United States and India
have not had particularly close ties. U.S. policy toward the
region has been vague, and national interests, generally,
remain low. The major source of American interest in the
region has been to counter Soviet advances and influence on
the subcontinent, and to maintain freedom of navigation,
including SLOC security.
The Indian Ocean SLOCs will grow in importance throughout
the 1990s. Critical resources are shipped through the Indian
Ocean and Southeast Asian straits; valuable resources lie in
the seabed. An Indian desire to exert more influence over the
Indian Ocean region makes India a potential source of regional
instability. Although India sees itself as a stabilizing
regional force, doubts remain in the region and indeed as far
away as Southeast Asia, not to mention Washington. The U.S.-
India relationship has not been an easy one: given the issues
discussed in this thesis, it appears that neither Washington
nor New Delhi can take bilateral relations for granted.
Enhancing fruitful ties between India and the United States
136 Peter J.S. Duncan, The Soviet Union and India (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), p. 43. SAARC
prohibits discussion of "bilateral and contentious issues."
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requires constant work. Both nations must work to strengthen
positive relationships, although troubling issues such as
Diego Garcia, neutralization of the Indian Ocean, and nuclear
weapons capabilities will undoubtedly remain.
Changes in the global political environment are providing
the impetus for rekindling relations. Soviet "New Thinking"
has brought about detente and the end of the Cold War between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly, warming
Sino-Soviet relations have resulted in a need for the
reevaluation of their bilateral relations with other
countries, such as India. Since 1988, Indo-Chinese relations
have become somewhat more amicable. Although rising tension
in the Middle East threatens to dampen the euphoria of warming
relations worldwide, many nations continue to work bilaterally
to establish a better understanding of their neighbors.
As this thesis has attempted to indicate, Washington needs
to realize that it cannot expect India to do exactly what the
United States wants. Nevertheless, American natioinal
interests, taking into consideration U.S. expectations of the
region, must of course be Washington's top priority. In turn,
New Delhi needs to recognize that U.S. concerns and subsequent
decisions may not always parallel or coincide with India's
interests. Given its global commitments, the United States
requires continued, unrestricted sea lanes of communication in
the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, while India does not want
external actors to remain involved in regional affairs.
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The dilemma here for India is that its military "high-
handedness" and the increasing role of India's military in
both internal and regional conflicts promotes belligerent
solution not the "peaceful approach" to problem solving voiced
by New Delhi. On the other hand, India will be able to
negotiate from a position of strength in conflict resolution.
The U.S. policy of assisting Pakistan at the expense of
India has been successful, perhaps bested illustrated by the
withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan. Nevertheless,
close U.S.-Pakistan ties have created an atmosphere of
animosity between Washington and New Delhi. Pakistan will
always be the weaker power in the subcontinent. Perhaps our
interests can now be better served in the region by supporting
India. A recent U.S. decision to suspend military aid to
Islamabad is certainly a move welcomed in New Delhi. The
United States should reassess and adapt its Pakistan policy to
the current strategic environment. In the best of all
possible worlds, the United States would seek to align itself
more fully with the strategic regional power (India) while
seeking to balance that power by protecting the integrity of
somewhat weaker states (particularly Pakistan).
The United States could also help regional stability
through encouraging friendlier relations between New Delhi and
Islamabad. Washington's dialogue with New Delhi could also
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discourage Indian hostility toward Pakistan. The United
States should encourage Indian action in moderation.
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The superpower rivalry and subsequent end of the Cold War
has shifted the global strategic environment. At the regional
level India has demonstrated a power projection capability
with the Indian Navy carrying out limited actions in the
Indian Ocean. Although Indian naval forces do not present an
insurmountable threat to U.S. interests by themselves, India-
U.S. relations today make it difficult to envision India in a
"naval partnership" with America in the foreseeable future.
Even in of Gorbachev's political agenda, the changing
strategic environment will most likely not fully allow
extremely close U.S.-India military ties.
Developing friendly bilateral ties between India and its
neighbors is crucial to regional stability and prosperity.
Although India's neighbors are concerned with the Indian Naval
buildup, growth in the naval forces will undoubtedly continue
until New Delhi attains its desired strength.
An issue that concerns India's neighbors is New Delhi's
ability to enhance India's military independence, creating an
emerging military-industrial complex. Indigenous construction
137 The potential exists for a situation similar to "Iran-
Iraq" with Pakistan and India. The United States must
carefully assess the cost of doing business with either
nation.
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and technology may well weaken external restraints on Indian
action.
Continuing the current round of port visits provides an
opportunity to develop better U.S.-India military relations
and expand the dialogue. Ultimately joint naval exercises
should be considered.
Nevertheless, the United States must weigh very carefully
the implications of being too closely associated with the
emerging hegemonic power in the region. It is an open
question whether Indian and U.S. interests are converging in
the Indian Ocean. After all, the goal of "insulating" the
Indian Ocean from external actors will continue to be a high
priority of Indian foreign policy, even if it appears to be
unattainable in the near future.
Certainly, a "naval partnership" is too big of a step.
Although Americans and Indians share a variety of mutual
interests, a number of areas continue to present oarriers to
improved relations. The United States and India have been
acrimonious and distrustful of each other. A cultural gap
exists which presents an added facet to the complex
relationship. Finally, India is not willing to join in a
"partnership" with the United States. The United States and
India need a firmer basis to develop ties. The r Aationship
must be based on trust and mutually satisfying experiences
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